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ABSTRACT
In philosophy, essentialism involves the claim that everything that
exists has a fundamental character or core set of features that makes it
what it is. Although this idea developed out of Platonic notions of ideal
forms, it has spread beyond philosophy into the social sciences and
hard scientific disciplines like mathematics and biology. Since the ad-
vent of postmodernism, discussions around essentialism have become
controversial. Adherents of postmodern theory argue that social catego-
ries, such as gender, race, and sexuality are socially constructed and
that essentialist notions of identity, which suggest that identity is
static, natural, and unchanging, are theoretically wrong. This
postmodern perspective has engendered a significant and often conten-
tious debate on the value of essentialist thought in contemporary iden-
tity movements focused on gender, sexuality, and race.
In the context of these debates, essentialism has taken on a pejora-
tive character and a negative moral connotation, especially among
progressives and left-leaning social activists. The consequences of this
moral condemnation are far-reaching. It makes it difficult for identity
groups to organize around any social category deemed to be essential-
ist. This morally-grounded prohibition is especially problematic for
Black nationalists and African-centered activists.
In this Article, I examine the anti-essentialism critique that has de-
veloped in Critical Race and LatCrit legal theory. I argue that the anti-
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essentialism critique offered by critical theorists is misguided insofar
as it claims that the assertion of a conscious racial identity is morally
wrong. In reaching this conclusion, I first point out some contradic-
tions and failings in the reasoning underlying the critique. Next, I de-
tail some of the difficulties that adherence to anti-essentialism creates
for Black communities and activists. Finally, I link normative ap-
proaches to essentialism to culture and worldview. I argue that anti-
essentialism is Eurocentric and its claim to a universal moral prohibi-
tion against race-consciousness is false.
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“In other words, to say that I am an African, that I can participate
in a society as an African, I don’t have to become – I don’t have to
adopt European values, European esthetics, European ways of doing
things in order to live in the world.”
—August Wilson1
“BaKongo think of every human being as a vessel for an
empowering soul or spirit . . . Minkisi are constituted in the same way,
although the containers are not human bodies but figurines, clay pots,
1. Interview by Bill Moyers with August Wilson, Pulitzer Prize-Winning
Playwright, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 20, 1988), http://billmoyers.com/content/
august-wilson/ [https://perma.unl.edu/JJ8L-9T5W].
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gourds, or bundles, among others. The empowering spirits of minkisi
come from the land of the dead . . . .”
—Wyatt MacGaffey2
“Eventually, the fetish came to stand as a category of thought,
belief and practice against which the West understood itself. At a time
when the Western Enlightenment proclaimed the necessity of reason
and rationality, the fetish stood as an example of the horrors of
superstition and bestial irrationality, ‘the very image of the truth of
unenlightenment.’ The fetish was all the West was not.”
—Jason R. Young3
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally speaking, “essentialism” is the idea that all things have
a fundamental character—an “essence”—that is permanent and unal-
terable.4 Applying essentialist thought to groups results in the belief
that group members share essential qualities that confer group mem-
bership.5 They may also possess unessential or accidental qualities
that are not needed to affirm group membership, but do not preclude
membership either.6 For example, as an African-American I could as-
sert that my phenotypic appearance is an essential part of my Black-
ness,7 but the fact that I am a lawyer is not.
When it comes to social categories, such as gender, race, sexuality,
or identity, essentialism is highly controversial.8 Adherents of
2. WYATT MACGAFFEY, KONGO POLITICAL CULTURE: THE CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGE OF
THE PARTICULAR 78–79 (2000).
3. JASON R. YOUNG, RITUALS OF RESISTANCE: AFRICAN ATLANTIC RELIGION IN KONGO
AND THE LOW COUNTRY SOUTH IN THE ERA OF SLAVERY 105 (2007).
4. See Andrew Sayer, Essentialism, Social Constructionism and Beyond, 45 SOC.
REV. 453, 456 (1997).
5. Id. at 457.
6. Id. at 458–59.
7. A note on terminology: I use “Black” and “African-American” interchangeably
throughout this Article to refer to persons residing in the United States who are
of African descent. “Black” denotes racial, ethnic, and cultural identity rather
than mere physical appearance and is therefore capitalized. See Kenneth B.
Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 64 n.7 (1993) [hereinafter Nunn, Rights Held Hos-
tage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge]. Moreover, I use the word
“African” to refer to all persons of African descent, including members of the Afri-
can diaspora, regardless of where they may reside. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The
Black Nationalist Cure to Disproportionate Minority Contact, in JUSTICE FOR
KIDS: KEEPING KIDS OUT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 135, 138 (Nancy J.
Dowd ed., 2011).
8. See Sayer, supra note 4, at 454 (arguing that “essentialism is . . . a philosophical
concept . . . whose definition and critique quickly gets us into arguments as old as
philosophy itself”).
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postmodern theory argue that social categories are socially con-
structed and that essentialist notions of identity, which suggest that
identity is static, natural, and unchanging, are theoretically wrong
and suggestive of biological determinism.9
Consequently, “essentialism” is a bad thing. It is an epithet, a pejo-
rative and derogatory adjective. This is especially true in newer ver-
sions of critical theory,10 postmodernism itself,11 and among social
groups that identify themselves as politically “progressive.”12 In these
circles, essentialist thinking is decidedly looked down upon and an in-
dication that the proponent of the idea is in need of correction.13 As
one writer summarizes it, essentialism is “a term of abuse which si-
lences or short-circuits arguments, being irredeemably tainted by as-
sociation with racism and sexism.”14
As a Black nationalist and an African-centered scholar,15 I am par-
ticularly interested in the essentialism debate. Black nationalism is a
broad and diffuse ideology that centers on the importance of creating
9. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
10. By “newer versions of critical theory,” I mean postmodern critical theory and
other takes on critical theory developed after the Frankfurt School. See Jean
Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Electronic Revolu-
tion: Will Technology Help or Hinder the Cause of Law Reform?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
847 (1991) (using the term “outsider jurisprudence” to describe jurisprudence de-
rived from critical theory).
11. See Sayer, supra note 4, at 454 (describing post-structuralist forms of anti-
essentialism).
12. The term “progressive” is not well defined, but generally it is applied to left-lean-
ing political groups. See Steven G. Gey, Why Rubbish Matters: The Neoconserva-
tive Underpinnings of Social Constructionist Theory, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1723
(1999) (“A ‘progressive’ political or legal theory therefore seeks to broaden access
to political power for traditionally excluded individuals . . . .”); Alex Gourevitch,
The Contradictions of Progressive Constitutionalism, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1159, 1162
(2011) (describing “progressive” as a “familiar set of left-liberal policies” including
affirmative action, gay rights, and gun control).
13. See DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE AND DIFFERENCE xi
(1989) (describing essentialism as “an expression of disapprobation and dispar-
agement” that is “predictably summoned as a term of infallible critique”); Sayer,
supra note 4, at 453 (describing view of essentialism as “overwhelmingly
derogatory”).
14. Sayer, supra note 4, at 453.
15. African-centered scholarship is scholarship grounded in African cultural realities
that challenges “the presently fashioned disciplines of history, psychology, sociol-
ogy, political science, linguistics, archeology, anthropology, and philosophy as pa-
rochial Europe-centered discourses inundated with a presumption of universality
that none of them warrant or demonstrate.” ERROL ANTHONY HENDERSON,
AFROCENTRISM AND WORLD POLITICS: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM xi (1995); see
generally Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAW & INEQ. J.
323, 328–38, 328–30 nn.18–24 (1997) (discussing key African-centered scholars
and their ideas).
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and maintaining Black political, economic, and cultural unity.16 For
the Black nationalist project to be viable, it is necessary for African-
descendant peoples to organize and act collectively.17 And it is impor-
tant for African-descendant peoples to defend this collective associa-
tion politically, ethically, and morally. In this regard, the position that
Black nationalists occupy vis-a`-vis essentialism is similar in some re-
spects to that occupied by feminists who seek to organize themselves
as women.18 Consequently, there is a rich literature about essential-
ism in feminist circles, as well as a contentious debate about its appli-
cability, that can be instructive for African-centered scholars.19
Debates over essentialism have been a part of legal analysis since
the foundation of the critical legal studies movement in the late 1970s
and have only intensified since then.20 The origin of Critical Race The-
ory (CRT) can be traced to differences over race essentialism or “ra-
cialism” within the critical legal studies movement21 and staking out
a non-essentialist position vis-a`-vis race has been an important goal
for both critical race scholars22 and scholars in the related area of La-
tina/Latino critical studies (LatCrit).23 Virtually all of this radical le-
gal scholarship takes a negative view of race essentialism and thus
16. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 783–86 (describing va-
rious Black nationalist movements).
17. See infra Part III.
18. See, e.g., Susan Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism and Gender Skepticism, in
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 133, 135 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
19. See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-
Franc¸ois Lyotard, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 18, at 107; FUSS,
supra note 13; Janet Ransom, Feminism, Difference and Discourse: The Limits of
Discursive Analysis for Feminism, in UP AGAINST FOUCAULT: EXPLORATIONS OF
SOME TENSIONS BETWEEN FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM 123 (Caroline Ramazanog˘lu
ed., 1993); Kate Soper, Productive Contradictions, in UP AGAINST FOUCAULT: EX-
PLORATIONS OF SOME TENSIONS BETWEEN FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM supra, at 29;
Christine Di Stefano, Dilemmas of Difference, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM,
supra note 18, at 63.
20. See SHARYN L. ROACH ANLEU, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 64 (2000); JAMES BOYLE,
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES xiv (1994); John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Inti-
mate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984); Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A
Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1516 (1991); Roberto Mangabeira Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 564 (1983).
21. See KIMBERLE CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT xxiii–xxvi (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [herein-
after CRENSHAW ET AL., KEY WRITINGS] (describing ideological differences be-
tween CLS and race crits that emerged during 1986 and 1987 Critical Legal
Studies Conferences); see also Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of
Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253,
1294 (2011) (describing CLS “critique of some of the work as essentialist, and
that the emergence of narrative in the growing canon were flights of racial
fantasy”).
22. See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
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disfavors efforts to organize African-Americans along the lines of race
or analyze their condition using racial categories.24
Within this condemnation of essentialism is a normative claim.
The anti-essentialist argument is not simply an objection that essen-
tialism does not comport with postmodern theory. Anti-essentialists
also contend that essentialism infringes a prescriptive code of conduct
that makes essentialism immoral.25 The moral claim raised here as-
sumes that to conceive of a person or group of persons in essentialist
terms is hurtful. It is hurtful because to make an essentialist claim
about a person is to deprive the person of agency in selecting the as-
pects of their identity that are important to them and that they desire
to perform or foreground at any given moment.26
Under this reasoning, to assert that a thing, individual, or collec-
tive has an essential characteristic is wrong both factually (there are
no essential qualities) and ethically. If we are talking, then, about the
conscious choice to express racial identity, to organize politically
around this identity, and to use this identity as an intellectual and
ideological foundation for interpreting the world—if this is “essential-
ist,” it is morally wrong. Anti-essentialism, then, presents a stark bar-
rier to African-centered thought. As I explain in this Article, African-
centeredness celebrates the conscious choice of racial identity and
uses African identity as a wellspring for political organizing and ideo-
logical theorizing.27
Essentialism concerns are often offered as a reason why Africans
should not organize collectively or why they should be cautious doing
24. See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
25. This moral claim is implicit. Although anti-essentialism is deployed in ways that
show the disfavored status of essentialist reasoning, see supra notes 8–14 and
accompanying text, the normative basis for this practice is rarely discussed. See
Jared Sacks, Against Essentialism? Going Deeper . . . , COLUM. L. SCH.: NIETZ-
SCHE 13/13 SEMINAR (Apr. 12, 2017), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/nietzsche1313/
jared-sacks-against-essentialism-going-deeper [https://perma.unl.edu/SP4T-
K6NJ] (arguing that “[l]ike racism, the term essentialism is imbued with a pejo-
rative connotation” but that “[t]his normative judgement is rarely interrogated:
to call one’s thinking essentialist tends to be seen as nothing more than an in-
sult”). For my part, I have been unable to find any scholarship focused on the
normative aspects of the anti-essentialist argument.
26. See Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SIS-
TER OUTSIDER 114, 120 (1984) (“As a Black lesbian feminist . . . I am constantly
being encouraged to pluck out some one aspect of myself and present this as the
meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying the other parts of self.”); see also Angela
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
588–89 (1990) (“[I]n an essentialist world, black women’s experience will always
be forcibly fragmented before being subjected to analysis, as those who are ‘only
interested in race’ and those who are ‘only interested in gender’ take their sepa-
rate slices . . . .”).
27. See infra section III.C.
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so.28 Black nationalistic political arguments are seen as particularly
problematic in critical legal scholarship, even within the confines of
CRT.29 This is true because, to anti-essentialists, Black nationalist ar-
guments reinforce nineteenth century racial categorizations in an in-
vidious way.30 Moreover, Black nationalism establishes a definition of
Blackness that can be policed at its boundaries, enforcing a kind of
conformity that many postmodernists find unattractive.31 Finally, the
idea of Black nationalism, or political organization along the lines of
race, runs counter to the postmodern idea of an identity that is shift-
ing and contingent.32
This normative position is problematic for activists who are inter-
ested in organizing African and African-descendant communities. If
asserting a racial identity is immoral, then the only form of political
involvement and organizing available to Africans is integration into
collectives that are multiracial and therefore not essentialist. The
anti-essentialist position, like post-racialism,33 suggests that there
are no common problems and issues that Black people face as a com-
munity and need to address collectively and independently.34 It sug-
gests, as a matter of ethics, that the slogan “All Lives Matter”
represents a better moral position than the slogan “Black Lives
Matter.”35
28. See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
30. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution in Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 36 (1991) (showing relationship of essentialist concepts of race and nine-
teenth century ideas of racial hierarchy and “pure racial types”); Peller, supra
note 16, at 790 (discussing similarities between Black nationalism and white
supremacy); E. Frances White, Africa on My Mind: Gender, Counterdiscourse,
and African American Nationalism, in WORDS OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRI-
CAN-AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT 504, 512 (Beverley Guy-Sheftall ed., 1995) (cri-
tiquing Black nationalist thought as replicating errors of nineteenth century
racists).
31. See Gary Peller, Notes Toward a Postmodern Nationalism, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
1095, 1099 (describing Black nationalists of the 1960s–70s as “highly authorita-
rian in their emphasis on ‘authenticity’”).
32. See Harris, supra note 26, at 584 (endorsing postmodern view of self as composed
of multiple identities that are never fixed); Gary Peller, History, Identity, and
Alienation, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1479, 1500 (2011) (discussing anti-essentialist view
that racial categories lack fixed, stable meaning and are historically-contingent).
33. Sumi Cho defines “post-racialism” as “a twenty-first-century ideology that re-
flects a belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the
state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based reme-
dies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of
social action.” Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009).
34. See id. at 1593 (“[P]ost-racialism denigrates collective Black political
organization.”).
35. In the months following the death of Florida youth Trayvon Martin, “Black Lives
Matter” became a Twitter hashtag, political slogan, and social movement. J.
Clara Chan, What Is ‘All Lives Matter’? A Short Explainer, WRAP (July 13, 2016),
http://www.thewrap.com/what-is-all-lives-matter-a-short-explainer/ [https://per
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A moral claim, however, is one that is based upon values and not
facts.36 Indeed, a moral claim cannot be evaluated outside of a system
of values or axiology.37 It is the values that underlie postmodernism
and critical theory that lead to the moral assessment that essential-
ism, including race essentialism, is wrong.38 But the values of anti-
essentialism are not universal. The style of anti-essentialism that con-
cerns us here, and that I critique, derives from deconstructionism,
critical theory, and postmodernism. While these philosophies arose as
critiques of positivism and Enlightenment thinking generally, they
are still part of a continuum of Eurocentric thinking and thus embrace
the epistemology, ontology, and axiology of the West.39
This genealogy is important because it explains why anti-essential-
ism is so particularist, with a narrow focus on individuality over col-
lectivity. It also explains why the postmodern view of the self, in
which anti-essentialist values are grounded, is so fragmented and
alienated.40 And it explains why, in the critical race literature, anti-
essentialism is deployed as a barrier to Black political organizing but
not to prevent the organizing of other oppressed groups.41
When centered in different values—values grounded in the African
tradition—not only does the anti-essentialist moral claim lose its
force, but the logic of the anti-essentialist position evaporates as
well.42 African values are not Western values. African values are com-
munal values wherein the self is imagined as part of an extended net-
work of interconnected beings.43 This interconnectedness leads to
different ethical concerns than articulated in postmodern and critical
ma.unl.edu/K822-B7SN]. Later, the phrase was countered by the catchphrase
“All Lives Matter,” which was ostensibly offered as a more universal slogan that
did not focus solely on the lives of Blacks. Id. However, in the social context
where “All Lives Matter” arose as a rejoinder to “Black Lives Matter,” it operated
as racial backlash and its purported universalism left the special claim of the
importance of Black lives silent. See Tyler Huckabee, The Problem with Saying
“All Lives Matter,” RELEVANT (July 6, 2016), http://www.relevantmagazine.com/
current/nation/problem-saying-all-lives-matter [https://perma.unl.edu/K6N3-
9CQN].
36. Aaron Rappaport, The Logic of Legal Theory: Reflections on the Purpose and
Methodology of Jurisprudence, 73 MISS. L.J. 559, 572 (2004) (providing that
“[n]ormative statements are claims about how we are obligated to act” and should
be distinguished from empirical statements).
37. Id.
38. See infra section IV.A.
39. See infra notes 207–309 and accompanying text.
40. See john a. powell, The Multiple Self: Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity
and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1483–84 (1996) (noting that many
feminists and postmodernists have asserted that “the self is by its very nature
fragmented: an illusory notion constructed as static and unitary, but in reality
completely fluid”).
41. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 217–241 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 231–240 and accompanying text.
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theories.44 Limitations on the agency or free will of the self are not
remarkable in African-centered contexts because the self is already
constrained by its communal commitments.45 Consequently, norma-
tive arguments against essentialism are simply not germane.
This is not to say that there are not important political questions
raised by anti-essentialists. There are indeed. At the very least, these
include the questions of how to determine commonality and difference,
as well as the problem of asserting a false universalism. At some
point, a choice must be made about how a group should be defined and
who should be included. But it must be understood that these
problems are political in nature and must be resolved on the political
battlefield through the process of articulation and struggle.46 They
cannot be resolved by appeal to abstract theories. To attempt to do so
simply evades the problem.
In the way anti-essentialism has been deployed within legal schol-
arship, there is a moral prohibition against Black nationalist political
organizing. Because Black nationalism has been defined as essential-
ist, organizing on that basis is declared unethical and problematic
from the outset.47 The real pressing questions regarding the political
definition and future of Black people thus are never confronted. How
can one theorize about Black people if the effort to do so is shut down
at the start as ethically wrong?
In this Article, I conclude that a morally-grounded critique of es-
sentialism is misplaced. I do not believe that there is anything about
essentialism qua essentialism that makes it ethically suspect.48 In
particular, I do not think that the effort to block Black nationalist
identity formations, or to manage and to control them so that they are
only provisionally essentialist,49 can be justified. In Part I, I examine
the anti-essentialism critique as it has been deployed in critical race
and LatCrit scholarship. In Part II, I “critique the critique” and point
out how it is both theoretically inconsistent and reductionist. In Part
III, I specifically focus on the impact of the anti-essentialist position
44. See infra notes 231–240 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 231–240 and accompanying text.
46. See Stuart Hall, The Rediscovery of “Ideology”: The Return of the Repressed in
Media Studies, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA 70 (Michael Gurevitch et al.
eds., 1982) (describing a semiotic process of meaning making where competing
groups struggle to assert their interpretations of reality); see also Stuart Hall,
Notes on Deconstructing “The Popular”, in PEOPLE’S HISTORY AND SOCIALIST THE-
ORY 227, 232–33 (Raphael Samuel ed., 1981) (discussing how meaning results
from “the dialectic of cultural struggle”).
47. See Peller, supra note 16 (discussing disfavored and essentialist aspects of Black
nationalist movements).
48. In this respect, I agree with Diana Fuss’s claim that “essentialism is neither good
nor bad, progressive or reactionary, beneficial or dangerous.” FUSS, supra note
13. What matters about essentialism is “[w]here, how and why is it invoked[.]” Id.
49. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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on the African community. I argue that it impedes African political
organization and leaves African communities vulnerable to oppres-
sion. In Part IV, I look at the Eurocentric values that underlie anti-
essentialism and contrast those with African-centered values. I con-
clude that anti-essentialism does not represent a universal ethical
prohibition against collective Black organizing and that as a theory it
is not relevant to African-centered thought.
II. THE ANTI-ESSENTIALISM CRITIQUE IN CRITICAL RACE
AND LATCRIT SCHOLARSHIP
Essentialism has a particularly bad reputation when it comes to
racial analyses because it is associated with openly racist ideology.
The founding ideologues of European scientific racism, men such as
Blumenbach50 and De Gobineau,51 were racial essentialists.52 They
argued that the differences between the races were fundamental and
unchanging. In their view, there was a natural hierarchy of the races,
with the white race at the top and Africans at the bottom. This point of
view became popularized and was widely held in the West for most of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.53
In white supremacist thought, Africans, for instance, were sup-
posed to be naturally inferior to whites. Carolus Linnaeus, the father
of taxonomy, described Blacks thusly in his Systema Natura, “Afri-
canus: black, phlegmatic, relaxed; hair black, frizzled; skin silky; nose
flat; lips tumid; women without shame, they lactate profusely; crafty,
indolent, negligent; anoints himself with grease; governed by ca-
price.”54 Notice how Linnaeus confuses traits of character and behav-
ior with physiological traits, embracing what we now call biological
determinism.55
50. Johann Blumenbach was perhaps the most important of the race cataloguers and
his influence extended well into the twentieth century. BRUCE BAUM, THE RISE
AND FALL OF THE CAUCASIAN RACE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF RACIAL IDENTITY 95,
101, 177, 187 (2006). Blumenbach divided humanity into five races: Mongolian,
American, Caucasian, Malay, and Ethiopian. Id. at 76.
51. Id. at 7. De Gobineau was the author of the racist tract, The Inequality of the
Human Races. Id. at 128.
52. FRANCISCO BETHENCOURT, RACISMS: FROM THE CRUSADES TO THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 332 (2013) (discussing the essentialism of scientific racism).
53. Id. at 1.
54. WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NE-
GRO, 1550–1812, at 220–21 (1968). Europeans, on the other hand, were described
as “White, sanguine, muscular. Hair: flowing, long; Eyes: blue. Gentle, acute, in-
ventive. Covered with close[-fitting] vestments. Governed by laws.” BAUM, supra
note 50, at 66.
55. See W. Carson Byrd & Matthew W. Hughey, Biological Determinism and Racial
Essentialism: The Ideological Double Helix of Racial Inequality, 661 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 8, 10 (2015) (defining “biological determinism” as “the
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When it comes to race, anti-essentialism is offered as a way to
avoid the objectification and denigration of people of color and to
counter racial stereotyping with the “affirmation of multiple black
identities”56 and “a varied black experience.”57 This negative view of
essentialism is a hallmark of poststructuralist and postmodern
thought. According to Stuart Hall and David Bailey:
Poststructuralist thinking opposes the notion that a person is born with a
fixed identity - that all black people, for example, have an essential underly-
ing black identity which is the same and unchanging. It suggests instead that
identities are floating, that meaning is not fixed and universally true at all
times for all people, and that the subject is constructed through the uncon-
scious in desire, fantasy and memory.58
CRT adopts this postmodern anti-essentialist perspective as well.
One of the earliest discussions of essentialism in law occurs in Angela
Harris’s Black feminist critique of essentialism in feminist legal liter-
ature. Harris echoes the postmodern perspective and claims the essen-
tialism of white feminist authors imposes a “monolithic ‘women’s
experience’” that silences the particular experiences of women of color,
sexual minorities, and the poor.59 As a postmodernist, Harris dis-
avows the existence of a unified self, and instead promotes the idea of
multiple selves or a “multiple consciousness.” According to Harris:
[W]e are not born with a “self,” but rather are composed of a welter of partial,
sometimes contradictory, or even antithetical “selves.” A unified identity, if
such can ever exist, is a product of will, not a common destiny or natural
birthright. Thus, consciousness is “never fixed, never attained once and for
all”; it is not a final outcome or a biological given, but a process, a constant
contradictory state of becoming . . . .60
While first generation CRT scholars such as Derrick Bell and Rich-
ard Delgado raised structuralist critiques of U.S. law and society, sec-
ond generation CRT scholars took what has been described as a
“postmodern turn,” and adopted many of the precepts and concepts of
the postmodernists/poststructuralists.61 As a result, the essentialism/
anti-essentialism debate, which had prior to this time been more of a
concern in feminist scholarship, began appearing with greater fre-
quency in the CRT literature. For example, in the introduction to their
belief that race is anchored in a person’s genes and, thus, racial inequality is
largely the result of biological predispositions”).
56. BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER AND CULTURAL POLITICS 28 (1990).
57. Id.
58. David A. Bailey & Stuart Hall, The Vertigo of Displacement: Shifts Within Black
Documentary Practices, in 2 TEN 8 PHOTO PAPERBACK No. 3, 9–24 (1992).
59. Harris, supra note 26, at 588.
60. Id.
61. See Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory’s Cutting
Edge: Key Movements That Performed the Theory, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS,
AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 32, 52 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal
Culp & Angela Harris eds., 2002) [hereinafter CROSSROADS] (relating adoption of
postmodernism and anti-essentialism by CRT scholars).
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canonical anthology on CRT, Crenshaw, Peller, Gotanda, and Thomas
state:
[O]ne of the chief problems with the racialist account of social power and
struggle lies in the tendency to “essentialize” the racial communities with
which it represents the social world. In black racialist circles the felt necessity
to articulate the stable vision of group identity and interest has underwritten
a “representational politics” in which the experience of one segment of black
America is taken as the representative of the black experience tout court [in
totality]. As a result, Black racialism yields a flat, fixed image of racial iden-
tity, experience and interest which fails to capture the complex and changing
realities of racial domination in the contemporary US.62
This language expresses the authors’ concern with essentialism as
such, stating that “racialists” focused on the experience of one seg-
ment of the Black community (without identifying what segment that
was) and they thus failed to capture the “changing realities of racial
domination” (without describing what these changing realities were).
But actual criticism of Black activist politics does not seem to be the
authors’ intent here. What the authors appear to be doing is simply
rendering a critique that acknowledges and embraces the postmodern
conception of the nature of things as inherently unstable and chang-
ing. But this ideological congruency comes at a price. The postmodern
perspective that Crenshaw et al., advocate here rejects any analysis
that looks for underlying or core causes of oppression (these are “flat”
and reductionist) and political strategies that seek to construct Black
unity around common endogenous political understandings or goals
(these would be a form of forbidden “representational politics”). This of
course is a direct critique of the civil rights movement, which forged a
political struggle out of disparate strands, and of any call for Black
unity, such as Black nationalism or Pan-Africanism.
In the CRT literature, however, we can recognize critiques of dif-
ferent styles of essentialism. Crenshaw, Peller, Gotanda, and Thomas
distinguish between a weak essentialism, consisting of a discursive
view of race that recognizes race as real, albeit socially constructed
(which they accept) and a strong version of essentialism that leans
toward biological determinism (which they reject).63
Peller also takes this approach in a recent article where, seeking to
defend Kimberle´ Crenshaw from charges of race essentialism in her
work, he attempts to distinguish weak essentialist language in her
writing from the strong essentialism expressed in the work of the late
Derrick Bell, the founder of CRT.64 “Bell’s analysis,” Peller claims,
62. CRENSHAW ET AL., KEY WRITINGS, supra note 21, at xxxi.
63. See id. at xxvi (decrying “vulgar anti-essentialism” and describing the CRT pro-
ject as “an effort to construct a race-conscious [but] anti-essentialist account of
the processes by which law participates in true ‘rac-ing’ of American society”).
64. See Peller, supra note 32, at 1501 (arguing Crenshaw does not contend “Black
community has a stable, essential identity”).
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“could be regarded as predominantly ‘racialist’ [essentialist] in that it
took the existence of racial commonalities as a given, rather than as
collectivities whose culture and dynamics were contested and contin-
gent.”65 Peller continues on to assert that the greatest flaw in Bell’s
work was that “for the most part Bell did not problematize the com-
munities whose interests his race theory deployed.”66
However, some Critical Race Theorists reject any version of race-
based identity at all. This can be seen in the writing of Francisco
Valdes,67 one of the founders of LatCrit Theory. According to Valdes:
“Critical Race Theory is sometimes experienced and described as
both androcentric and Afrocentric, as well as heterocentric.
Thus, . . . Critical Race Theory . . . has found itself confounded with
the objection that it has replayed the omissions and the oversights of
the majoritarian status quo.”68 Consequently, LatCrit (according to
Valdes) sought to shift to alliances “built on shared substantive com-
mitments, . . . rather than on traditional fault lines like ethnicity or
race”69 and this “entails rejection of automatic or essentialist common-
alities in the construction of coalitions . . . .”70
The radical character of the LatCrit version of anti-essentialism
can be seen in Stephanie Phillips’s contribution to a 1999 LatCrit
symposium in the Miami Law Review. In the essay, Phillips responds
to a proposal to develop a “BlackCrit” as an additional critical race
perspective alongside LatCrit (which for all intents and purposes has
subsumed CRT). Phillips writes:
The principal reason why I would hesitate to endorse a separate BlackCrit
organization is . . . [that] [h]istorically and presently, there are many exam-
ples of regressive black nationalism that, for instance, deny that there is sex-
ism in the black community, attempt to legitimate homophobia, and deny that
blacks can be ‘racist’ in relation to other people of color or whites. I think
that . . . without the discipline that would be provided by working with people
who come from other subject positions, there would be a substantial danger
that a black nationalist formation would degenerate into the regressive type.
Sadly, there also may be too few blacks in legal academia who endorse a dis-
65. Id. at 1494.
66. Id. at 1495. In other words, Bell is subject to Peller’s criticism because he focused
on the Black communities’ commonalities and not their differences.
67. See, e.g., Margaret E. Montoya & Francisco Valdes, “Latinas/os” and the Politics
of Knowledge Production: LatCrit Scholarship and Academic Activism as Social
Justice Action, 83 IND. L.J. 1197, 2002–04 (2008); Francisco Valdes, Latina/o
Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal
Culture: From Practices To Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996); Francisco
Valdes, Race, Ethnicity, and Hispanismo in a Triangular Perspective: The “Essen-
tial Latina/o” and LatCrit Theory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305 (2000).
68. Valdes, supra note 67, at 5.
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id.; see also Keith Aoki & Kevin R. Johnson, An Assessment of LatCrit Theory Ten
Years After, 83 IND. L.J. 1151, 1157 (2008) (arguing anti-essentialism is one of the
foundational principles of LatCrit).
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tinctively progressive black nationalism for a new organizational form to be
warranted.71
Thus, for Phillips, African descendants lack the legitimacy to or-
ganize politically and intellectually to address social and political con-
cerns as they interpret them for themselves. To do so would be
“essentialist.” Their legitimacy to organize must be granted by others
outside of their collective, whose interests trump those of the Black
community, and who can then exercise a form of censorship to make
sure that the resulting ideology is truly “progressive.”
Charles Santiago72 also attacks “essentialist social construc-
tions”73 in his LatCrit symposium article comparing and contrasting
Samuel Huntington’s white nationalism and Gloria Anzaldu´a’s Chi-
cano nationalism. Santiago concedes that these nationalisms have dif-
ferent political orientations—Huntington’s nationalism is
conservative and white supremacist;74 Anzaldu´a’s is in opposition to
cultural and colonialist oppression.75 Yet, Santiago argues that both
are problematic due to their embrace of racial essentialism and a reli-
ance on a “similar set of myths and rhetorical claims.”76 When it
comes to essentialism, clearly the political ends do not justify the
means in the eyes of LatCrit scholars like Santiago. Essentialism is
always wrong because, according to Santiago, “it is possible to demon-
strate how nationalist narratives reproduce undesirable forms of ex-
ploitation, subjugation, subordination, and oppression.”77
Nowhere in his article, however, does Santiago demonstrate that
Anzaldu´a employs any language that would “reproduce undesirable
forms of exploitation, subjugation, subordination and oppression,” al-
though he does demonstrate this with Huntington. Anzaldu´a’s error is
simply deploying an essentialist argument. To Santiago, it is essen-
tialism itself that causes “exploitation, subjugation, subordination and
oppression.”78
In their introduction to the edited collection Crossroads, Direc-
tions, and a New Critical Race Theory,79 Valdes, Culp, and Harris
claim “we are all antiessentialists now.”80 They note, “[I]t now has be-
come almost de rigeur for feminists, critical race theorists, and queer
71. Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Workshop with
LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247, 1255 (1999).
72. Charles R. Venator Santiago, Huntington’s White Patriotism and Anzaldu´a’s
Brown Nationalism, 4 FIU L. REV. 33 (2008).
73. Id. at 42.
74. See id. at 36–40.
75. See id. at 34.
76. Id. at 42.
77. Id. at 44.
78. Id.
79. CROSSROADS, supra note 61.
80. Id. at 2.
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theorists to use antiessentialism to argue that the traditional catego-
ries of race, class, and sexuality, and the identity warriors within
those categories, are defined in ways that exclude or subordinate the
voices of the non-privileged . . . .81
Yet, Valdes, Culp, and Harris collectively assert a more complex
and somewhat muted anti-essentialism in comparison to Valdes’s solo
writings under the banner of LatCrit Theory. While they trace anti-
essentialism to its postmodern origins, Valdes, Culp, and Harris ad-
mit that there is nothing inherently progressive about anti-essential-
ist arguments and concede that they can be used by the right as
readily as they can be used by the left.82 Indeed, Valdes, Culp, and
Harris caution that anti-essentialism, if not properly tempered, can
block goals of transformative justice. “Antiessentialism,” they state,
“can be, and perhaps has become, a way of not only co-opting CRT
externally but also of distracting us internally from the bottom line:
antisubordinationist social transformation.”83 Rather than jettison
the anti-essentialist critique, however, Valdes, Culp, and Harris argue
that CRT should “forge a potent theory and praxis through a critical
and self-critical melding of identity-conscious analysis, anti-essential-
ist politics, and anti-subordination principles.”84
Cho and Westley85 also embrace a weak anti-essentialism that of-
fers several critiques of stronger forms of anti-essentialism. These au-
thors note that anti-essentialism is potentially destabilizing and that
it lends itself to the right’s attack on race-consciousness.86 Race con-
sciousness is also placed under pressure by postmodernism itself.87
According to Cho and Westley, “one of the main dangers . . . of anties-
sentialism is its potential to promote an abstract and endless expedi-
tion into the celebration of individual particularity.”88 Thus, like
Valdes, Culp, and Harris, they note anti-essentialism needs a limiting
principle to avoid this tendency to dissolution.89
Cho and Westley argue that the limiting principle to anti-essen-
tialism should be the commitment of an essentialist formation to “ac-
tivist struggle within and among communities of color for social
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2–3 (noting conservative claim that forces opposing appointment of Justice
Thomas to the Supreme Court had an “essentialist agenda” and characterizing
attacks on racial diversity as anti-essentialist).
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id.
85. Cho & Westley, supra note 61, at 54.
86. Id.
87. See id. (arguing postmodern turn put race and group identity “under pressure,
even erasure”).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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justice.”90 With this limiting principle in place, Cho and Westley as-
sert their commitment to a weak form of anti-essentialism. Conse-
quently, they distinguish between “conscientiously essentialist
political groupings”91 that formed as a result of anti-essentialist criti-
ques of larger groups and “crudely essentialist political groupings
whose narrow nationalisms or (hetero)sexisms subverted progressive
political formations.”92
The problem with Cho and Westley’s distinction between “consci-
entious” and “crude” essentialism is that it really does not provide a
limiting principle at all. One can imagine that a conscientiously essen-
tialist political grouping could spawn a smaller conscientiously essen-
tialist political grouping, which split off because of its own anti-
essentialist critique of the first group, and so on ad infinitum.93 For a
limiting principle to work, it must prevent the continual splintering of
a political group so that the achievement of its goals is possible.
Cho and Westley do offer a true limiting principle of sorts, but one
must read between the lines to make it out. While they support “con-
scientiously essentialist political groupings,” they do not support polit-
ical groupings “whose narrow nationalisms or (hetero)sexisms
subverted progressive political formations.”94 The key terms in this
explanation are “narrow nationalisms,” “(hetero)sexisms,” and “pro-
gressive.” While Cho and Westley do not seek to define these terms
further, it is clear they are political in character. Cho and Westley’s
limiting principle, then, is to distinguish between essentialist political
groupings worthy of support and those that are not, by reference to
how valuable their politics are. It is likely that groupings organized
around Black nationalism would be viewed by Cho and Westley as
“crudely essentialist,” and groups organized around non-traditional
genders and sexualities would be “conscientiously essentialist.” Cho
and Westley, however, make an important theoretical contribution
here by demonstrating that decisions on how much essentialism a
given group should tolerate is fundamentally a political decision that
may vary depending on the political context.95
As indicated by the preceding discussion, some CRT theorists, in-
cluding several associated with LatCrit, are committed to a strong
90. Id.
91. Id. at 55.
92. Id.
93. In fact, this is what usually happens in the real world. For example, feminism
arose as anti-essentialist critique of male dominated groupings. Women of color
raised an anti-essentialist critique of feminism, yet feminists of color groups may
be open to critiques based on able-ism, heterosexism, classism, etc. See id. at 54
(cautioning against “an abstract and endless expedition into the celebration of
individual particularity”).
94. Id. at 55.
95. Id.
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anti-essentialism that rejects the formation of identity and in particu-
lar Black identity, around race.96 Other CRT theorists offer a weak
anti-essentialism that permits the formation of a contingent, socially
constructed Black identity that, nonetheless, should be differentiated
from other race-conscious conceptualizations of Blackness, such as
Black nationalism, “Afrocentrism,” and the racial ideology of the Na-
tion of Islam.97 It should be clear that both of these accepted forms of
critical race anti-essentialism are integrationist in their approach.
They assume that the goal of political organizing for Black people
must be to integrate further into white systems. Thus, the only accept-
able political strategy for Blacks is coalition building within the white
system with either the white majority or with various minority group-
ings.98 Consequently, any Black organizational formation can only be
“provisional” and “tentative,” lasting only long enough to serve as a
platform for coalitional politics.99
Both the strong and the weak critiques of essentialism described in
the CRT literature are normative in character. They both assume that
the assertion of an essential racial identity, and particularly a Black
racial identity, is wrong and should be avoided, if at all possible. In
the remainder of this Article, I put this assumption to the test, first by
examining the theoretical coherence of postmodern anti-essentialist
claims in their own right, then by considering them through the alter-
native axiology found in the African cultural context.
III. “CRITIQUING THE CRITIQUE”: SOME THEORETICAL
PROBLEMS WITH THE CRITICAL RACE
ANTI-ESSENTIALISM ARGUMENT
The attractiveness of anti-essentialism is linked to the adoption of
postmodern concepts and arguments by a significant cadre of second
generation CRT theorists.100 Thus, CRT critiques of race essentialism
can be evaluated through a critical assessment of the postmodern
principles on which they are based. In this section, I first discuss some
doctrinal and ideological concerns posed by postmodernism that
problematize the anti-essentialist argument as it is deployed in CRT.
96. See, e.g., supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text; Phillips, supra note 71.
97. See, e.g., Cho & Westley, supra note 61; see also CRENSHAW ET AL., KEY WRITINGS,
supra note 21, at xxxi (criticizing the “crude essentialism” of Black racialist polit-
ics, such as the Nation of Islam’s Million Man March).
98. See, e.g., Cho & Westley, supra note 61, at 54 (arguing for a limited essentialism
to promote progressive political formations).
99. Id.
100. See id.; see also John Hayakawa To¨ro¨k, The Story of “Towards Asian American
Jurisprudence” and Its Implications for Latinas/os in American Law Schools, 13
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 271, 291 (2002) (arguing second-generation critical race
scholars are exemplified by an “over-emphasis on postmodern narratives and
their denigration of activism”).
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Next, I critique aspects of the anti-essentialist argument that are not
necessarily dependent upon postmodernism, but which raise indepen-
dent concerns. Finally, I describe the ways that the essentialism cri-
tique fails to advance the theoretical commitments of CRT.
A. Missing the “Postmodern Turn”
European philosophical essentialism can be traced to Platonic con-
cepts about ideal forms. Plato believed that our perceptions of reality
were ephemeral and fleeting. What we perceived with our senses were
simply reflections of pure abstracted ideals he called “Forms.”101
Forms are the eternal, fixed, pure, and transcendent source of the
properties of all objects.102 For example, we can see and observe a
black cat, but that cat is made up of at least two ideal forms, that of
“blackness” and that of “catness.” “Blackness” and “catness” are never
changing, abstract ideals that exist in a world apart from the one we
access with our senses.103 Thus, Platonists would argue Forms have
an independent existence. Forms then are the true essence of all ob-
jects as they provide the answer to the question, “what is x?”104 The
independent existence of Forms also explains why our minds can con-
ceive of permanent and stable things in a world that is constantly
changing.
This view of essence became the standard philosophical outlook of
the Mediterranean world,105 and what later came to be known as
Western civilization, for over two thousand years until it was chal-
lenged by the emergence of empiricism and positivism in the post-En-
lightenment era.106 Yet, even in the twentieth century some remnants
of essentialist thinking remained in the form of the grand narratives
of modernist thinking, or what the postmodernists came to criticize as
“totalizing” or “structuralist” thought.107 Grand narratives or
101. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY 398 (Donald J. Zeyl et al. eds., 1997).
102. ROBERT WILLIAM JORDAN, PLATO’S ARGUMENTS FOR FORMS 5 (1983).
103. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 101.
104. Id.
105. See Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, pt. II, ch. XVI–XX passim
(1945).
106. See id. at pt. II, ch. XIII passim.
107. See Jason E. Whitehead, From Criticism to Critique: Preserving the Radical Po-
tential of Critical Legal Studies Through a Reexamination of Frankfurt School
Critical Theory, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701, 716 (1999) (“[P]ost-modern theories
merely posit that no such social totalities, such as capitalism and liberalism, ex-
ist.”). Foucault described the postmodern rejection of totality thusly:
[M]y aim is most decidedly not to use the categories of cultural totalities
. . . in order to impose on history, despite itself, the forms of structural
analysis. The series described, the limits fixed, the comparisons and cor-
relations made are based not on the old philosophies of history, but are
intended to question theologies and totalizations.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 15–16 (1972).
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“metanarratives” invoke essentialism because they embrace a narra-
tive schema that appeals to universal knowledge or truth.108 Accord-
ing to John Stephens, “a metanarrative is a global or totalizing
cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and
experience.”109 Everything has its place in the overarching schema
and this explains what it is. These perspectives are thus “total-
izing.”110 They invoke a totality because there is no place outside of
the narrative schema from which alternative points of view can be
created.111
CRT theorists borrow this anti-structuralist skepticism of the es-
sentialism inherent in metanarratives. According to Sumi Cho and
Robert Westley, “CRT stands opposed to powerfully entrenched sys-
tems of totalizing knowledge that function through selection and ex-
clusion of data.”112 Yet by throwing their lot in with the
poststructuralist crowd, CRT theorists also inherit a range of ideologi-
cal contradictions that are not generally recognized in the CRT litera-
ture. First, while CRT purports to be interested in the local, as
opposed to the global or universal, the indeterminacy of postmodernist
approaches to knowledge actually prevents understanding in specific
local contexts. Second, postmodernism embraces a reductive empiri-
cism that, like the positivism abhorred by CRT, reduces phenomenon
to only that which the observer experiences. Third, CRT cannot recog-
nize the operation of non-material forces—whether these be historical,
cultural, metaphysical, or spiritual—as postmodernism rejects these
as totalizing abstractions or manifestations of essence. Finally,
postmodernism leads to moral and empirical relativism as it rejects
the existence of any standard through which comparisons of value
could be made. I address each of these below.
CRT embraces postmodern claims of indeterminacy to the extent
that it concurs that “all texts and social structures were unstable, in-
108. See M.M. Slaughter, The Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy, Honor, and Freedom
of Speech, 79 VA. L. REV. 153, 201–02 (1993) (“For postmoderns, liberalism and
communitarianism are both essentialisms . . . . Each is the imposition of a hegem-
ony or totality: each one claims to be a completed truth, a totality . . . .”).
109. JOHN STEPHENS & ROBYN MCCALLUM, RETELLING STORIES, FRAMING CULTURE:
TRADITIONAL STORY AND METANARRATIVES IN CHILDREN’S LITERATURE 6 (1998).
110. Paul Babie, The Spatial: A Forgotten Dimension of Property, 50 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 323, 332–33 (2013) (quoting EDWARD W. SOJA, THIRDSPACE 71 (1996)) (defin-
ing “totalizing” as thinking that proceeds in privileged binary terms so that other
perspectives are silenced).
111. See id.
112. Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions: Key Movements That Per-
formed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377, 1408–09 (2000); see also Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Critical Race Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187,
1193 (2004) (“The desire to integrate postmodern skepticism toward the law
within a modern framework of law and reason . . . became a central theme in
critical race scholarship.”).
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determinate, and largely rooted in the contexts of societies and the
language societies use to speak about the world.”113 But this accept-
ance of the postmodern indeterminacy critique creates a paradox: the
postmodern preference for local and particular realities can never be
realized. This is because the local must be linked to the global in order
to be distinguished from everything else. Otherwise, the local is
merely a transient experience devoid of meaning; it is the linkage/op-
position of the local to the global that makes the local “local.”114
Accepting the postmodern claim of indeterminacy suggests we can
never be certain about the meanings or contours of social phenomena.
Indeed, it is uncertainty, or difference, that is celebrated as the core of
the postmodern condition. Yet, if one insists that facts are indetermi-
nate, one cannot isolate particular facts, or facts relevant to particular
events, with any confidence. All facts are the same.115 As Malik ar-
gues, this leads to ahistoric explanations of social phenomena.116 Ac-
cording to Malik, to understand the local, its relationship to the
global—that is, the broader social setting—must be traced.117 “Repu-
diating such certainty, and celebrating ambivalence, denies us the
ability to grasp social phenomena in their specificity.”118 Without de-
fining the essence of a social fact or phenomenon, “[w]e would be una-
ble to understand, for instance, what is specific about the modern
concept of race, and would instead be forced into the kind of ahistoric
explanation in which race becomes an eternal feature of human
societies.”119
113. Tommy J. Curry, Shut Your Mouth When You’re Talking to Me: Silencing the
Idealist School of Critical Race Theory Through a Culturalogical Turn in Juris-
prudence, 3 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 1, 7 (2011).
114. See Kenan Malik, Universalism and Difference: Race and the Postmodernists, 37
RACE & CLASS 1, 5 (1996) (“In order to be historically or socially specific, one must
understand the determinations of any social fact and its relationship to the total-
ity in which it appears.”).
115. As Catharine MacKinnon puts it: “According to postmodernism, there are no
facts; everything is a reading, so there can be no lies. Apparently it cannot be
known whether the Holocaust is a hoax, whether women love to be raped,
whether Black people are genetically intellectually inferior to white people,
whether homosexuals are child molesters.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points
Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687, 703 (2000).
116. Malik, supra note 114, at 5.
117. Id. at 6. Fran Amery makes a similar argument, pointing out that Foucault’s
deployment of “genealogy” to demonstrate the social construction of ideas would
not be possible unless linkages could be made between social facts and the related
ideas that preceded them. See Fran Amery, Allowing the Other to Speak: The
Relevance of Postmodernism to Political Analysis, 1 REINVENTION: J. UNDERGRAD-
UATE RES., (2008), http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/iatl/reinvention/is-
sues/volume1issue2/amery/ [https://perma.unl.edu/6ET9-Z625].
118. Malik, supra note 114, at 5.
119. Id. at 6. Malik points out this result would, ironically, put postmodernists in the
same category as nineteenth century racists. Id.
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Another paradoxical feature of CRT’s postmodern turn is its as-
sumption that experiential facts are the only facts that matter.120 In
this regard, postmodernism resembles the positivism that it sets itself
in opposition to.121 Postmodernists frequently critique positivism for
its reliance on empiricism, that is, an epistemology based on sense ex-
perience.122 Positivists claim that there is an objective reality that can
be accessed independently of philosophical and theoretical ide-
ations.123 Yet, by asserting that “theory can have no recourse to deter-
minants beyond empirically given phenomena,”124 anti-essentialists
also implicitly acknowledge the existence of a reality that can be em-
pirically determined. This eliminates the operation of a natural es-
sence or a totalizing structure in social relations, but it also produces a
constricted view of social relations that may obscure motives, causes,
and justifications beyond those of the observer.125 Postmodernists are
really concerned with rejecting the positivist claim that natural es-
sences underlie social phenomena, but they take this argument much
further than necessary and reject all essences entirely.126
One consequence of this blanket rejection of essences is that
postmodernism limits the range of potential causes that can explain
phenomena in the natural world. Consequently, anti-essentialists
deny the operation of nonmaterial forces, whether these be historical,
metaphysical, or spiritual.127 Moreover, the rejection of essences and
the denial of structuralism means, if we are ideologically pure, there
can be no overarching constructs that replicate and exert influence
over time—no racism, no white supremacy, no sexism, and no patri-
archy.128 In other words, embracing anti-essentialism seems incom-
patible with much of what CRT concerns itself.129
120. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Criti-
cal Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
1241, 1285–86 (1993) (suggesting narrative is desirable under post-structuralist
reasoning because, in the absence of an external standard of legitimation, narra-
tives “can provide compelling accounts of how things are in society”).
121. Malik, supra note 114, at 6.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 6.
125. This, of course, is the point of the postmodern critique of positivism.
Postmodernists argue that ideology matters and that facts are never “just facts.”
See MacKinnon, supra note 115, at 703 (arguing that “there are no facts” for
postmodernists).
126. Malik, supra note 114, at 6.
127. Id. (claiming that to anti-essentialists, “[e]ssences and forces, whether natural or
metaphysical, spiritual or historical, are fictitious”).
128. See id. at 5–6 (discussing anti-essentialists’ inability to recognize capitalism).
129. See Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social
Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 151 (2014) (listing CRT commitments
including opposing classism, racism, homophobia, and anti-immigrant
sentiments).
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The critique that postmodernism leads to moral and political rela-
tivism has been made many times,130 and I do not wish to go over that
well-traveled ground here. I do want to make two points, however.
First, the moral relativism of postmodernism makes it difficult to
maintain that essentialism is morally suspect. If essentialism is error
because postmodernism requires it be so, it is contradictory to simul-
taneously maintain a normative opposition to essentialism when
postmodernism does not acknowledge normative claims.131 Second,
the relativism of postmodernism seems problematic for critical race
theorists in particular because, unlike some permeations of
postmodern thought, CRT has a particular political slant.132 Again, it
130. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals,
74 TEX. L. REV. 523, 534 (1996) (“[C]ultural relativism’s theory of ‘local’ truth
cannot be applied without making the kind of objective, transcultural claims that
the theory rejects.”); Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245,
1246 (2004) (“[A]s a consequence of the proximity of postmodernism to moral rela-
tivism, postmodernists lack a normative vocabulary with which to advance the
values they hold.”); Scott Fruehwald, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Postmodern
Legal Thought and Cognitive Science, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 375, 377 (2006)
(describing postmodern legal thought as “radically antifoundational, antitheoreti-
cal, and, thus, morally relativistic”); id. at 388–95 (discussing several problems
posed by moral relativism in postmodern legal thought); Joel F. Handler,
Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
697, 698 (1992) (“A major criticism of postmodern politics is that deconstruction
amounts to relativism or radical indeterminacy, which, at best, results in passive,
status quo politics and, at worst, fails to defend against fascism and terrorism.”);
MacKinnon, supra note 115, at 710 (describing postmodern collapse into relativ-
ism as opposed to “any attempt to grasp a real social world”); Christopher Norris,
Right You Are (If You Think So): Stanley Fish and the Rhetoric of Assent, in
WHAT’S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM 77 (1990) (reviewing STANLEY FISH, DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) and critiquing postmodern pragmatist rela-
tivism in science and other areas); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern
Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2505, 2510 (1992) (discussing “the charge that postmodernists are relativists”);
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
236 (2006) (arguing “Legal Realism and postmodernism” pose a threat to the rule
of law that “cannot be overstated”).
131. Even if a less radical version of postmodernism that allowed for normative claims
was adopted, the normative critique of essentialism would still be contradictory.
As Diana Fuss points out, “[t]o insist that essentialism is always and everywhere
reactionary is . . . to buy into essentialism in the very act of making the charge; it
is to act as if essentialism has an essence.” FUSS, supra note 13, at 21.
132. According to Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw, CRT is organized
around six principles:
(1) [CRT] recognizes that racism is endemic to American life. Thus, the
question . . . is not . . . how racial discrimination can be eliminated while
maintaining the integrity of other interests implicated in the status quo
. . . . Instead we ask how these traditional interests and values serve as
vessels of racial subordination. (2) [CRT] expresses skepticism toward
dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and
meritocracy. (3) [CRT] challenges ahistoricism and insists on a contex-
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is contradictory for CRT theorists to critique essentialism pursuant to
postmodernist principles, yet seek to promote distinct political aims
and goals that would be unrecognizable to postmodernism.
B. The Limits of Anti-Essentialism
Other problems posed by anti-essentialism do not necessarily arise
from anti-essentialism’s reliance on postmodernism but from flaws in
the anti-essentialist argument itself. These internal flaws can be char-
acterized, first, as contradictions caused by essentialism’s epistemo-
logical necessity and, second, as problems related to the overbroad
claims of anti-essentialists.
Anti-essentialists face an epistemological conundrum: if there are
no essential qualities, there can be no categories or classes of things; if
there are no categories of things, there can be no difference;133 if there
is no difference, there can be no comparison, no analysis. In other
words, some form of essentialism seems necessary for knowledge.134
Essentialist thinking provides a framework for understanding what
“any given thing really [is].”135 Consequently, “[i]f one could reduce
any given object to its essential categories, one could find all other
objects that were like it and distinguish them from all those objects
that were not.”136
The utility of essentialist thinking means that opposition to essen-
tialism is not opposition to essentialism per se, but opposition to the
tual/ historical analysis of the law. (4) [CRT] insists on recognition of the
experiential knowledge of people of color and our communities of origin
in analyzing law and society. (5) [CRT] is interdisciplinary and eclectic.
(6) [CRT] works toward the end of eliminating racial oppression as part
of the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression.
MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1993).
133. Anti-essentialists often assert that essentialism obscures difference. But this is
not universally true. Indeed, “Since the whole point of attempting to categorise is
to specify what, if anything, is common in the midst of diversity, the search for
common properties, including essences, presupposes diversity.” Sayer, supra note
4, at 456.
134. See Pauline E. Peters, Another Bridge to Cross: Between “Outside” and “Inside,”
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 481, 482 (1997) (arguing that “some degree of essential-
ism—as typification—is inherent in all conceptual practice”); see also Alan C.
Love, Typology Reconfigured: From the Metaphysics of Essentialism to the Episte-
mology of Representation, 57 ACTA BIOTHEORETICA, 51, 55–58 (2009) (pointing out
the necessity of categorization in the biological sciences for explanatory purposes
and suggesting a move from a metaphysical focus on essentialism to the practical
concerns of epistemology).
135. Rainier Elias, Identity, Law, and Essentialism: What’s Love Got to Do with Same
Sex Marriage?, 6 CRIT 1, 5 (2012).
136. Id.
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particular ways essentialism is deployed.137 As one scholar puts it,
“some degree of essentialism is simply unavoidable. The disputes are
usually over what essences we should accept as important, not
whether essences can be dispensed with.”138 Accordingly, what the
anti-essentialist advocates rightly point out is that essentialism in-
volves making decisions “over what essences we should accept as im-
portant”139 and, more critically, who wields the power to make these
decisions.140 Thus, the anti-essentialism critique serves left-leaning
critical interests “by drawing attention to how supposedly universal
and inclusive concepts actually extrapolate from a particular social lo-
cation, suppressing difference and marginalizing others.”141 This,
however, is a political critique and not a metaphysical one.142
Anti-essentialists also undermine their theoretical position
through exaggerated and unnecessarily strident claims.143 Strong ver-
sions of anti-essentialism—and critical race and LatCrit theorists
seem to fall in this camp—take an extreme, all-or-nothing approach to
essences.144 Their position is that essences do not exist and that es-
sentialism is always in error.145 But such an extreme position is
neither justified nor necessary. It is certainly possible to conclude that
some things have essences and some do not.146 Andrew Sayer sug-
gests that “we need to get beyond the stark alternatives of essential-
ism and anti-essentialism and work with a richer ontology.”147 Sayer
would describe a more workable theory of essentialism as one that fo-
cuses on “whether a specific property is essential or necessary for
137. Diana Fuss recognizes this when she argues that the goal of critical inquiry into
essentialism should be “to investigate what purpose or function essentialism
might play in a particular set of discourses.” FUSS, supra note 13, at xii.
138. Gregor McLennan, Post-Marxism and the ‘Four Sins’ of Modernist Theorizing, 21
NEW LEFT REV. 53, 67 (1996).
139. Sayer, supra note 4, at 465.
140. Id. at 461 (arguing anti-essentialism critique “opens up questions of who has the
power to define and categorise”).
141. Id.
142. Cho and Westley also lean toward a politically focused critique of essentialism.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
143. See Sayer, supra note 4, at 460–62 (arguing that rejection of essentialism in gen-
eral, rather than rejection of specific types of essentialism, creates a range of
unnecessary epistemological and ontological problems).
144. See supra Part I.
145. Sayer characterizes this strong anti-essentialism as absurd: “It is dogmatic and
illogical to insist that because examples of context-dependent and positional phe-
nomena such as gender and identity are impressive that we must insist on a
restrictive ontology which makes everything of this kind and refuse claims that
some things do have essences.” Sayer, supra note 4, at 462.
146. Sayer takes this more moderate position, arguing that some objects and catego-
ries have essences, such as water or capitalism, whereas others, like gender and
ethnicity, do not. Id. at 455, 462.
147. Id. at 455.
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some specific behavior or outcome,”148 rather than an overarching re-
jection of essence as such.149
Under Sayer’s analysis, essentialists “might refer to what is essen-
tial about them belonging to particular social groups, or to what is
human about them, or to the essential properties of the body.”150 But
these different ideations of essence could have different properties,
different durations, and different strengths.151 Some essences may be
used conceptually to determine what properties of an object are indis-
pensable for it to be what it is (these would be its generative proper-
ties).152 Essence can also be used in the sense of identifying the
features of an object that distinguish it from other kinds of objects
(these would be its distinguishing properties).153 And simply because
an object has some feature that is essential for a particular purpose
does not mean an essence cannot change.154 For example, Sayer
points out that while the ability to communicate may be considered an
essential part of being human, the ability to communicate is acquired
and develops over time.155
C. Aligning CRT Theory and Praxis
For critical race theorists, CRT is an intellectual movement with a
distinct ideological purpose.156 It is distinguished from mainstream
legal analysis by its left-leaning political agenda and from critical le-
gal studies by its race-consciousness.157 Crenshaw et al., describe
CRT as “a movement of left scholars . . . whose work challenges the
ways in which race and racial power are constructed and represented
in American legal culture and . . . society.”158 According to Crenshaw
et al., CRT goes beyond intellectualizing to pursue activism. CRT
scholars desire not only to study racial hierarchies but to change
148. Id. at 457.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See generally id. at 456–60.
152. Id. at 458.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 462.
155. Id.
156. See DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 1 (3d ed. 2014) (“[CRT] seeks to use the law as an affirmative tool to
improve the lives of people of color.”); Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Pro-
posed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
85 (1994), as reprinted in BROWN, supra, at 2–3 (“[M]ost crits agree that the basic
objective of CRT is to use the law to effectuate racial equality.”).
157. See CRENSHAW ET AL., KEY WRITINGS, supra note 21, at xiii–xiv (describing differ-
ences and similarities between cls and CRT).
158. Id. at xiii.
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them.159 Moreover, CRT scholars believe knowledge is political and
thus reject scholarly claims of neutrality and objectivity.160 Clearly
then, CRT has adopted an explicit political program.161 But how does
this political program fit with CRT’s theoretical arguments?
There is no inherent value in theorizing. The value of theory can
only be determined by how well it comports with reality or with the
pragmatic goals the theory is used to attain.162 That is to say, the
theoretical approaches of CRT are only worthwhile to the extent they
advance the purposes of CRT. As we have seen, anti-essentialism does
not necessarily advance leftist political goals.163 Indeed, anti-essen-
tialism itself seems politically neutral in a way that conflicts with the
CRT rejection of neutrality. In particular, the CRT commitment to
race-consciousness seems difficult to accomplish in an environment
where race-essentialism is frowned upon. To the extent that
postmodernism results in a view of the world that is nihilistic, ahis-
toric, and relativistic, it cannot serve as a viable theoretical construct
to permit the attainment of CRT’s goals.164 Thus, it would seem
postmodern anti-essentialism is a theory with limited value to critical
race theorists.
Yet, anti-essentialism has become an accepted part of the CRT ca-
non. As detailed above, several critical race theorists have struggled to
reconcile anti-essentialism’s contradictions with the professed pur-
poses of CRT.165 However, the efforts of scholars like Valdez, Culp,
Harris, Cho, and Westley to tame the more destructive aspects of
postmodern anti-essentialism seem strained. Through adoption of
some sort of limiting principle, it is possible that anti-essentialism can
be shoehorned into CRT, but why? What doctrinal benefits can be
159. See id. (arguing that the purpose of CRT is “not merely to understand the vexed
bond between law and racial power but to change it”).
160. See id. (claiming CRT “rejects the prevailing orthodoxy that scholarship should
be or could be ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’”).
161. See supra note 130.
162. Indeed, “unity of theory and practice was a basic tenet of Marxist thought.” JOEL
SPRING, PEDAGOGIES OF GLOBALIZATION 89 (2006). Mao illustrates this point in a
1937 tract:
Marxists consider that only the social practice of people can be the true
criterion of human knowledge of the world surrounding us. The practical
situation is such that only in the process of social practice (in the process
of material production, class struggle, scientific experiments) can human
knowledge be confirmed by obtaining the results expected from it.
MAO TSE-TUNG, CONCERNING PRACTICE 2–3 (Trinity Trust 1951); see also AMILCAR
CABRAL, UNITY AND STRUGGLE 45 (Michael Wolfers trans., 1979) (“[A]nyone who
leads a national liberation struggle must . . . weigh up and make plans which
respect reality and not what he has in his head.”).
163. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
164. Malik makes this same point in respect to postmodernism generally. See Malik,
supra note 114.
165. See supra Part I.
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gained, or what intellectual commitments must be served that make
these intellectual gymnastics worth the effort? Clearly, these are not
benefits or commitments that advance the expressed interests of CRT,
nor are they benefits or commitments that advance the interests of
communities of color.166 For anti-essentialism to work for Black com-
munities, it must allow them to pursue their collective interests. Oth-
erwise it is simply dogmatism.167
IV. ANTI-ESSENTIALISM AND THE DESTRUCTION
OF BLACK COMMUNITY
A. A Practical Problem: Anti-Essentialism and Urban
Realities
In the 1970s, Washington, D.C. was known as “Chocolate City.”168
This was because, at the time, the city’s demographics were predomi-
nantly Black and D.C. was host to a vibrant and established Black
culture.169 But the demographics of the District have changed radi-
cally. The District, which was once chocolate, is now “cappuccino,”170
and may soon be cafe´ au lait,171 as white millennials have entered the
city and Black residents have been forced out.172 The Shaw/U Street
neighborhood, the location of the world-famous Ben’s Chili Bowl,173 is
a case in point. Once ninety percent Black, the neighborhood is now
166. Indeed, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza talks about the inutility of postmodern theorizing in
the contemporary African context:
[S]ome of the best scholarship in Africa, indeed, elsewhere in the world,
has often been inspired by . . . a burning desire to change the world, to
address the pressing issues of the time. . . .  [T]hat is why African schol-
ars, surrounded by material poverty and political tyranny, by un-
derdevelopment, to use a once popular term, are [more] preoccupied with
questions of development and democracy than about gazing at their sex-
uality that seems to titillate the intellectual imaginations of some of our
colleagues in “postmodern” societies.
PAUL T. ZELEZA, RETHINKING AFRICA’S ‘GLOBALIZATION’ 394 (2003).
167. By “dogmatism,” I mean the theory itself is reified. It is no longer a means to an
end but an end unto itself.
168. CHRIS MYERS ASCH & GEORGE DEREK MUSGROVE, CHOCOLATE CITY: A HISTORY OF
RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL 381 (2017); see also Parliament,
Chocolate City (Casablanca Records 1975) (describing Washington, D.C. as a
“chocolate city” along with its “vanilla suburbs”).
169. ASCH & MUSGROVE, supra note 168.
170. DEREK S. HYRA, RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN THE CAPPUCCINO CITY 20 (2017).
171. Or as filmmaker D.J. Franzia put it on Twitter, “Almond Soy Latte Lactose Free
Imitation Cacao Substitute City.” D.J. Franzia (@hawillisdc), TWITTER (Mar. 6,
2018, 8:00 AM), https://twitter.com/hawillisdc/status/971007547841933312
[https://perma.unl.edu/Y5Y8-RMCR].
172. HYRA, supra note 170.
173. See Ben’s Chili Bowl, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben%27s_Chili_
Bowl [https://perma.unl.edu/4D4K-E8CZ] (last updated June 11, 2018).
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occupied mainly by young white professionals.174 Now that Shaw/U
Street is majority white, the area receives government attention and
services that were once lacking.175 Although the quality of life has im-
proved in many ways, historic residents find the area unfamiliar and
uninviting.176 Black resident Ernest Peterson describes the sense of
alienation he now feels in an area that has been his home for over
forty years:
“I go outside, and these people who been here for 15 minutes look at me like,
‘Why you here?’ That’s that sense of privilege they bring wherever they go,” he
said in his front yard on a sunny Saturday in November. “I been here since
’78. They been here six months or a year, and they question my purpose for
being here.177
The transformation of Shaw/U Street has been aided by what
Michelle Boyd and other urban planners call “Black-branding.”178
Black-branding occurs when “neighborhood-based organizations, real
estate developers, restaurant owners and urban planners commodify
and appropriate aspects of Blackness to promote tourism, homeowner-
ship, and community development” in historically African-American
neighborhoods.179 Because Shaw/U Street was promoted as a Black
area, with a particular history and culture, it became a hip and trendy
place for whites to live.180 The influx of whites, attracted by market-
ing that featured the “edgy” and exotic character of the area,181 led to
higher rents and higher taxes that ultimately drove most of the ex-
isting Black residents out.182
It would be wrong to see the gentrification of Shaw/U Street in
purely economic or in purely racial terms. There were many factors
that led to the population shift in Shaw/U Street as the area was
redeveloped.183 However, race played a significant role in this trans-
formation.184 Shaw/U Street was a crime-ridden and neglected area
174. HYRA, supra note 170, at 58–59, 77. Over a forty-year period, the Black popula-
tion in Shaw/U Street has been reduced to thirty percent. Id.
175. See id. at 129 (citing both research that supports and questions the proposition
that low-income communities receive more benefits as more middle-income re-
sidents move into the communities).
176. See id. at 130–44.
177. Sam Gringlas, Old Confronts New in a Gentrifying D.C. Neighborhood, NPR
(Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/16/505606317/d-c-s-gentrifying-
neighborhoods-a-careful-mix-of-newcomers-and-old-timers.
178. HYRA, supra note 170, at 75.
179. Id. at 75–76.
180. Id. at 89.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 75; Gringlas, supra note 177.
183. See HYRA, supra note 170, at 124 (“[T]he Shaw/U Street findings suggest that
gentrification processes can be fully understood only through assessing multiple
social categories.”).
184. Id. at 106.
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with limited municipal services when it was occupied by Blacks.185
Once the area became attractive to whites, Blacks were forced out and
the area became the beneficiary of investment interest, tax expendi-
tures, policing, and other municipal services.186
How could, or should, the Black residents of the Shaw/U Street
neighborhood fight to retain the character of their neighborhood and
their place in it? According to anti-essentialists, they could organize
themselves economically, geographically, or chronologically. But to or-
ganize themselves as Black residents, with Black interests, would be
unethical.187 To do that would push them into the ranks of the essen-
tialists, and it would be politically disfavored and morally suspect.
Paradoxically then, the Black residents could lose their place in Shaw/
U Street because the very Black culture and history that they devel-
oped there was co-opted and exploited by others to attract whites, but
they could not organize around that same culture to protect them-
selves from white displacement.
This of course is an example of the uselessness of anti-essentialist
arguments for Black communities. Anti-essentialism is not a neutral
theory for Black people. Anti-essentialism harms Black communities
by preventing them from identifying their common interests and pro-
tecting those interests through collective activity. This is true for the
Shaw/U Street area in D.C. and it is true for any Black collectivity,
whether it is a neighborhood, an organization, a tribe, or a nation.
B. Anti-Essentialism, a New Form of Colorblindness?
Although marketed as a progressive ideology, anti-essentialism
does similar ideological work as do the conservative dogmas of color-
blindness and post-racialism.188 The first of these two, colorblindness,
is subject to three main critiques. First, by definition, colorblindness
cannot recognize, let alone correct, racial disparities and inequities.189
Second, colorblindness’s insistence on objective standards and univer-
sal procedures provides a smokescreen for racism and racial injustice
and thus acts as a “defensive shield for conscious and unconscious rac-
ists.”190 Finally, colorblindness enforces white political, social, and
185. Id. at 6–8.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
188. Critical race scholar Sumi Cho claims that colorblindness and post-racialism are
related but are different ideological positions. Cho, supra note 33, at 1597. In her
view, post-racialism is distinguishable from colorblindness because post-racial-
ism “signals a racially transcendent event,” appeals to a younger generation, and
is not burdened by the reactionary political baggage that colorblindness acquired
during the culture wars of the ’80s and ’90s. Id. at 1597–98.
189. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, supra
note 7, at 76–77.
190. Id. at 79–80.
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cultural hegemony by “maintain[ing] institutional arrangements
which embody the residual results of past overt racism.”191
Sumi Cho claims that post-racialism has four distinctive ideologi-
cal features: (1) a celebratory assertion of racial progress;192 (2) an
embrace of race-neutral universalism;193 (3) moral condemnation of
any race consciousness or race-based decisionmaking;194 and (4) a
“distancing move” that “highlights the purported distinctiveness and
sophistication of post-racialism.”195 There are two aspects of Cho’s cri-
tique that are particularly relevant here. One is post-racialism’s rejec-
tion of the legitimacy of group identity. According to Cho, “Post-
racialism rejects the centrality of race as an organizing feature in
American society and holds that policymakers formulate social and le-
gal remedies best without any consideration of group identity, espe-
cially racial identity.”196 Moreover, in Cho’s view, “post-racialism
denigrates collective Black political organization.”197 Under post-ra-
cialism, “[n]ot only are racial remedies and racial discourse off the ta-
ble, but so are acts of collective political organization and resistance
by racialized individuals.”198
Each of these critiques applies just as readily to anti-essentialism.
Anti-essentialism also rejects the legitimacy of race as a social cate-
gory and denigrates collective Black political organization. One could
argue that anti-essentialism is simply a “highfalutin,” leftist-intellec-
tual rebranding of post-racialism and colorblindness that shares many
of the same faults. Colorblindness, post-racialism, and anti-essential-
ism are all intellectual positions that work to retard Black political
organization and social development and consequently maintain white
power.
C. Black Consciousness and African-Centered Thought as
an Intellectual Counter to Anti-Essentialism
Although anti-essentialism disfavors Black organization around
ethnic or racial lines, there are African thinkers and scholars who vig-
orously contest these claims and provide an ideological alternative to
anti-essentialism’s politics and morality. They argue that attending to
the precepts of anti-essentialism would make African people vulnera-
ble to exploitation and prevent them from becoming autonomous ac-
tors in national politics or on the world stage. I detail the substance of
191. Id. at 80–81.
192. Cho, supra note 33, at 1601.
193. Id. at 1601–02.
194. Id. at 1603.
195. Id. at 1603–04.
196. Id. at 1603.
197. Id. at 1593.
198. Id. at 1596.
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the African-centered argument below. I argue this ideology contests
the moral framework adopted by anti-essentialists by introducing the
imperative of cultural survival and a teleological stance based on the
goal of African liberation.
Throughout history, the divide and conquer strategy has been used
by the powerful to subjugate the powerless, whether for colonization,
slavery, national oppression, or the domination of minority groups by
majorities within nations.199 The divide and conquer strategy is
widely used because it is effective.200 A disunified people—lacking or-
ganization and a concept of a collective self—can offer no opposition
and no resistance. Thus, divide and conquer is used as a strategy of
control in a wide variety of political situations, whether arising in in-
ternational relations, in the office setting, or on the playground.201 Af-
rican-centered scholar and educator Asa Hilliard contends that the
ultimate goal of any oppressor is the cultural surrender of his or her
victim. Hilliard writes:
Jordan Ngubane correctly pointed out that the primary goal during colonial
oppression in Africa and in other parts of the world was much broader than
the simple physical control of indigenous populations by outside colonizers.
The final victory and ultimate aim for the outside colonizer was to change the
colonized people by forcing an alienation between group members and their
cultural and historical traditions. This alienation promotes destruction of in-
dividual and group identity, thus disabling them politically as well.202
Black nationalists and African-centered scholars have consistently
identified cultural dispersion and disunity as one of the key causes of
Black powerlessness.203 This aspect of Black nationalism was identi-
fied by the Nigerian scholar E.U. Essien-Udom in his 1962 study of
the Nation of Islam.204 “The [Black] nationalist leaders,” wrote Es-
sien-Udom, “contend that the Negroes must become consciously aware
of their identity as a group in America; they must realize their degra-
dation and strive by individual and collective effort to redeem their
communities and regain their human dignity.”205 Even before the ad-
199. See Ilia Xypolia, Divide et Impera: Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of British
Imperialism, 44 CRITIQUE 221 (2016); see also Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitu-
tions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528, 546 (1999) (“During the colonial era, ethnic iden-
tities were bolstered and then manipulated as part of a divide and rule
strategy.”).
200. See Xypolia, supra note 199.
201. See id.
202. Asa G. Hilliard, III, Conceptual Confusion and the Persistence of Group Oppres-
sion Through Education, in THE MAROON WITHIN US 142, 147–48 (Asa G. Hil-
liard, III ed., 1995).
203. See ASA G. HILLIARD, III, AFRICAN POWER: AFFIRMING AFRICAN INDIGENOUS SO-
CIALIZATION IN THE FACE OF THE CULTURE WARS 3 (2002) (describing “lack of
unity” as one of the greatest obstacles to African success).
204. E. U. ESSIEN-UDOM, BLACK NATIONALISM: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY IN AMERICA
(1962).
205. Id. at 3.
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vent of 1960s Black nationalism, the Garvey Movement promoted
Black unity, Black consciousness, and Black pride on a worldwide
scale.206 Garvey fiercely advocated a “race-first” political program,
and racial unity and self-reliance were the chief components of his ide-
ological thrust.207 Garvey felt Black independence was a necessity for
continued Black survival.208 This belief led to his focus on economics
and his efforts to establish independent Black business ventures. In
Garvey’s mind, “[s]uccessful political action could only be founded on
an independent economic base.”209 Garvey heaped invective on Blacks
who advocated against racial unity:
The illiterate and shallow-minded Negro who can see no farther than his nose
is now the greatest stumbling block in the way of the race. He tells us that we
must be satisfied with our condition; that we must not think of building up a
nation of our own, we must depend on the good feeling of the other fellow for
the solution of the problem that now confronts us. This is a dangerous policy
and it is my duty to warn . . . the Negros of the world against this kind of
leadership . . . .210
Malcolm X also highlighted the critical importance of Black unity
in his public statements and especially in his speeches to Black audi-
ences.211 In one of his last speeches before his departure from the Na-
tion of Islam, Malcolm spent several minutes focusing on unity in his
own uncompromising style:
What you and I need to do is learn to forget our differences. When we come
together, we don’t come together as Baptists or Methodists. You don’t catch
hell because you’re a Baptist, and you don’t catch hell because you’re a Meth-
odist . . . . You catch hell because you’re a black man. You catch hell, all of us
catch hell for the same reason . . . . We have a common oppressor, a common
exploiter, and a common discriminator. But once we all realize that we have a
common enemy, then we unite—on the basis of what we have in common.212
Following in the footsteps of Black nationalists like Marcus Garvey
and Malcolm X, African-centered scholars have advocated a political
program that focuses on unity, political independence, and cultural
206. TONY MARTIN, RACE FIRST: THE IDEOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUGGLES OF
MARCUS GARVEY AND THE UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION 12–13
(1976).
207. Id. at 32.
208. Id. at 33.
209. Id.
210. 1 PHILOSOPHY AND OPINIONS OF MARCUS GARVEY 64 (Amy Jacques-Garvey, ed.,
Miguel Lorne Publishers & Frontline Books 2015) (1923).
211. See Charles Lewis Nier, III, Guilty As Charged: Malcolm X and His Vision of
Racial Justice for African Americans Through Utilization of the United Nations
International Human Rights Provisions and Institutions, 16 DICK. J. INT’L L. 149,
152 (1997) (describing unity as one of the solutions to Black problems frequently
stressed by Malcolm X).
212. MALCOLM X, Message to the Grass Roots (Nov. 10, 1963), in MALCOLM X SPEAKS 3,
4–5 (George Breitman, ed., 1965).
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autonomy.213 The restoration of African culture takes on a key signifi-
cance in African-centered thought.214 Indeed, the establishment of an
independent autonomous African culture is both the means and end of
the Black liberation struggle.215 Culture, or what Amos Wilson calls
“historical and cultural re-armament,” is one of the “primary tools
used by Black [or Afrikan] [sic] nationalists in breaking the mental
chains of [the] subordination of Afrikan peoples.”216 But an autono-
mous African culture, preferably expressed in the form of an autono-
mous nation-state, is the ultimate goal of African-centered politics.
Again, according to Wilson:
Black or Afrikan nationalism is . . . premised on the precept that Blacks as
people should not be the subjects of another people nor should they subject
other peoples; that Black people and nations should exercise their full rights
to develop and utilize their material, human and spiritual resources primarily
for their own benefit and well-being and for the benefit and well-being of
others as they see fit to do.217
The Nigerian writer Chinweizu can also be described as an Afri-
can-centered scholar.218 Like Garvey, Chinweizu contends that “Af-
rica First ought to be our constant motto, not Liberation First, not
Internationalism First, not Western Approval First, not Nonalign-
213. See, e.g., JOHN HENRIK CLARKE, AFRICANS AT THE CROSSROADS 3–25 (1991) (calling
for a world-wide African political, cultural, and spiritual revolution); ERROL
ANTHONY HENDERSON, AFROCENTRISM AND WORLD POLITICS 119–44 (1995) (sug-
gesting a reworking of traditional Pan-Africanism to provide a common unit of
analysis mechanism for change and consistent justification); AMOS N. WILSON,
BLUEPRINT FOR BLACK POWER 857 (1998) (advocating for a black-nationalist polit-
ical party for the purpose of furthering “the vital interests of the community and
protecting its physical, socioeconomic and sociopsychological integrity”).
214. See Asa G. Hilliard, III, To Be African, in TO BE AFRIKAN 17–21 (Burnett Kwadwo
Gallman et al. eds., 2003) (explaining the key importance of culture for African
identity); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Black Nationalist Cure to Disproportionate Mi-
nority Contact, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS: KEEPING KIDS OUT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 135, 151–52 (explaining cultural nationalist insistence
that African people maintain autonomous cultural institutions).
215. See AMILCAR CABRAL, National Liberation and Culture, in RETURN TO THE
SOURCE: SELECTED SPEECHES OF AMILCAR CABRAL 39, 41 (Afr. Info. Serv. ed.,
1973) (“Culture is simultaneously a fruit of a people’s history and a determinant
of history . . . .”). This is why Cabral argued famously for liberation fighters to
effectuate a “return to the source.” See AMILCAR CABRAL, Identity and Dignity in
the Context of the National Liberation Struggle, in RETURN TO THE SOURCE: SE-
LECTED SPEECHES OF AMILCAR CABRAL, supra, at 57, 63 (explaining the “return to
the source” as a form of cultural renaissance). For Cabral, culture had a preter-
natural resilience: “Repressed, persecuted, humiliated, betrayed by certain social
groups who have compromised with the foreign power, culture took refuge in the
villages, in the forests, and in the spirit of the victims of domination. Culture
survives all these challenges and through the struggle for liberation blossoms
forth again.” Id. at 61.
216. WILSON, supra note 213, at 851.
217. Id. at 850.
218. Henderson labels him as an “Afrocentric political scientist.” HENDERSON, supra
note 213, at 129.
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ment First.”219 Chinweizu’s theory can be understood as an example
of the use of the Akan concept of Sankofa220 (history) as the central
organizing principle for African political action.221 Sankofa provides a
“reference point” for what has been lost, what remains to be done, and
where African people should go.222 According to Chinweizu: “In any
serious attempt at African renaissance it would be necessary to dig
through that debris, down to the cultural bedrock of pre-European Af-
rica, and there inspect our cultural foundations so we can connect
with suitable strands of our cultural trajectory.”223
Marimba Ani is one of the leading African-centered theorists. She
discusses the political nature of culture and group identity in her
path-breaking work Yurugu224 and concludes, like Wilson, that group
identity is a prerequisite to political action and community defense.225
As she states:
Political behavior is simply behavior that issues from an awareness of group
definition as distinct from other groups. We think politically when we assess
our group interest in relation to the interests of other groups and determine
whether those interests are compatible with or in opposition to ours. We act
politically when our behavior and strategies reflect those assessments. Cul-
tural identification and ideological commitment are bases for political
consciousness.226
If Ani’s assessment is correct and group identity is the originator of
political consciousness, then the desire of the exploiters of African
communities to promote post-racialism and colorblindness makes per-
fect sense. Ani’s hypothesis also suggests that the proponents of anti-
essentialism are either misguided or that they too wish for the cul-
tural and political impotence of African people. This conclusion can be
taken from the cavalier way that anti-essentialism treats African
identity. Strict anti-essentialism does not recognize the legitimacy of
African identity at all,227 and weak anti-essentialism (discussed
219. CHINWEIZU, THE WEST AND THE REST OF US: WHITE PREDATORS, BLACK SLAVERS,
AND THE AFRICAN ELITE 497 (1975).
220. Sankofa is a symbol in the Akan Adinkra system that resembles a bird reaching
to touch its tail feathers. It literally means “reach back and fetch it” or “go back
and fetch it” and can be taken to illustrate the process of cultural recovery and
historical memory. Marimba Ani, To Be Afrikan: Toward the Healing, Rebirth
and Reconstruction of AFRIKAN CIVILIZATION: THE MAAT/MAAFA/SANKOFA PARA-
DIGM, in STATE OF THE RACE: CREATING THE 21ST CENTURY: WHERE DO WE GO
FROM HERE? 137, 141–43 (Jemadari Kamara & Tony Menelik Van Der Meer eds.,
2004) (discussing Sankofa).
221. See HENDERSON, supra note 213, at 128–29 (discussing Chinweizu’s theory as an
application of Sankofa).
222. Id.
223. CHINWEIZU, supra note 219, at 188.
224. MARIMBA ANI, YURUGU: AN AFRICAN-CENTERED CRITIQUE OF EUROPEAN CULTURAL
THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR (1994).
225. Id. at 5–6.
226. Id. at 6.
227. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
2018] “ESSENTIALLY BLACK” 321
above)228 only legitimates African group identity to the extent it can
be expressed in “collectivities whose culture and dynamics were con-
tested and contingent.”229 But a “contested and contingent” collectiv-
ity is not one that can exercise power or throw off the shackles of an
entrenched white supremacy.230 Anti-essentialism’s concern, how-
ever, is not with African liberation.231 It is chiefly concerned with ide-
ological consistency within Eurocentric thought and with political
relations in the United States and other European and European-de-
rived countries.232 Thus, the values of anti-essentialism are clearly in-
compatible with African-centered thought, as are its politics and
morals.
V. WORLDVIEW AND THE PERCEPTION OF ESSENCE
A. Axiological Position and the Question of Values
In this Part of the Article, I want to deal specifically with the nor-
mative question raised by the anti-essentialist critique. The critique
presents essentialism as something that is wrong and to be avoided
for reasons beyond the simple fact that it is believed to be theoretically
incorrect. For critical race theorists, essentialism is ethically incorrect
as well. As I have described in the Introduction, this moral component
of the anti-essentialism critique takes a decidedly pejorative slant.233
Ethics arise from values—an individual’s or community’s percep-
tion of the good.234 Anti-essentialist values derive from postmodern-
ism’s rejection of foundationalism and its skeptical stance toward
228. See id.
229. See Peller, supra note 32, at 1494.
230. This is true for the reasons Ani states, see supra note 224 and accompanying text,
and because political advocacy requires a cohesive culture. See ANI, supra note
224, at 5 (suggesting relationship between ideology and group cohesion).
231. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text for a discussion of how CRT
theorists “throw[ ] their lot in with the poststructuralist crowd.”
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 8–14 and accompanying text. In a similar vein, MacKinnon notes
that in some quarters essentialism is treated like “a contagious disease that you
have to . . . avoid catching.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Keeping It Real: On Anti-
“Essentialism,” in CROSSROADS, supra note 61, at 75.
234. According to Steven Salbu, “The ethical basis of a particular decision may be a
perceived universal truth, a socially constructed system of values and priorities, a
theoretically objective analysis of good and bad effects, religious imperatives, in-
ner promptings that compel a highly personalized set of beliefs, or a combination
of many such factors.” Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict:
The Trouble with Law-Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101 (1992).
Anthony Cook describes ethics as “the nomos of conduct, the rationally derived
normative structures that permit us to distinguish good from bad behavior.”
Anthony E. Cook, Forward: Towards A Postmodern Ethics of Service, 81 GEO. L.J.
2457 (1993).
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reason, objectivity, realism, and nature.235 Postmodernism thus privi-
leges freedom, independence, fluidity, and fragmentation and disfa-
vors tradition, order, and stability.236 These interests of
postmodernism result in a greater emphasis on individuality and indi-
vidual freedom than on group interests and collective identity.237
Catharine MacKinnon argues that “[a]nti-‘essentialism,’ as prac-
ticed, . . . corrodes group identification and solidarity and leaves us
with one-at-a-time personhood: liberal individualism.”238 Thus, at the
axiological level, anti-essentialists share the same individualistic val-
ues as the liberal structuralists they seek to critique.239
Obviously the discourses that have led to the postmodern moment
could only be based upon those that have come before.240 The genealo-
235. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF.
L. REV. 741, 748–50 (1994) (asserting that critical race theorists have adopted the
“profound doubt and skepticism” of postmodernism).
236. See Reza Dibadj, Postmodernism, Representation, Law, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 377,
383 (2007) (arguing that postmodernism rejects the Enlightenment meta-narra-
tives of reason, history, science, self, knowledge, power, gender, and the inherent
superiority of Western culture); Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern
Court: The Death of Necessity and the Transformation of the Supreme Court’s
Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1144 (1995) (“Postmodern culture is
diffuse, pluralistic, fragmented, and constantly changing.”).
237. See Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual
Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 270 (2002)
(“[P]ostmodernism, with its indictment of universal norms and essentialist analy-
ses, has been criticized as a return to individualism.”); Peller, supra note 32, at
1498 (describing Richard Ford’s postmodern anti-essentialism as having a “ten-
dency . . . to revert to liberal individualism”).
238. MacKinnon, supra note 233. In MacKinnon’s view, the focus on individual iden-
tity or “identities” over collective characteristics and interests leads to an isolat-
ing separateness and political powerlessness. “With the inability to assert a
group reality,” she writes, “an ability that only the subordinated need—comes the
shift away from realities of power in the world and toward the search for . . .
‘identities.’” Id.
239. Many postmodernists would reject the claim that postmodernism leads to greater
emphasis on individuality. A central postmodernist assertion is that there is no
unitary self and that this leaves no possibility for individuality. Fredric Jameson
declared that “individualism and personal identity is a thing of the past” and that
“the old individual or individualist subject is ‘dead.’” Fredric Jameson,
Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in POSTMODERNISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
THEORIES, PRACTICES 13, 17 (E. Ann Kaplan ed., 1988); see also powell, supra note
40, at 1490–99 (positing a postmodern fragmented view of self that is opposed to
the individualism found in mainstream Western notions of the self); Ruthann
Robson, The Specter of a Lesbian Supreme Court Justice: Problems of Identity in
Lesbian Legal Theorizing, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 433, 440 (1993) (describing the
“death of the subject” as a consequence of the postmodern critique of identity). My
own view is that the attempt to link modernism, but not postmodernism, with
individualism is theoretically incoherent.
240. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Illegal Aliens: Extraterrestrials and White Fear, 48 FLA. L.
REV. 397, 401 (1996) (“[M]eaning is constructed from concepts that already exist
within the social reservoir of ideas.”).
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gies that have produced postmodernism must be linked to the modern
and pre-modern moments that have preceded it.241 Postmodern
thought is not universal (it cannot be by its own precepts).242 It arose
in a specific place and time in a particular cultural context.243 This
cultural context must have influenced the form, content, and ultimate
meaning of postmodernism. Since postmodernism arose out of the
crucible of European philosophy and shaped itself by the dictates of
European culture, the interests, issues, and concerns to which
postmodernism responds are those that are salient and meaningful
within European culture.244
African-centered scholars such as Marimba Ani, Wade Nobles, Asa
Hilliard, and Na’im Akbar have raised an intense cultural critique of
Western civilization.245 These African-centered scholars take a con-
structivist view of culture and social institutions.246 From the African-
241. Fish argues as much when he describes “interpretive communities” as collectivi-
ties that place a prior constraint on interpretation. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A
TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 13–14 (1980) (arguing shared strategies for interpretation
“determine the shape of what is read”). As one legal scholar describes this process
of thought structuring:
No interpreter ever stands prior to or outside of interpretive practices,
which always and necessarily limit one’s interpretation of any text, in-
cluding the Constitution. In short, the practices of an interpretive com-
munity simultaneously enable and limit textual understanding: An
interpretive community organizes the world for its members by relating
phenomena “to the interests and goals that make the community what it
is.”
Stephen M. Feldman, The Return of the Self, or Whatever Happened to
Postmodern Jurisprudence?, 9 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 267, 273 (2017).
242. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
243. As Nigerian scholar Adeshina Afolayan points out in discussing Zeleza’s views
concerning the cultural limitations of postmodern theory, postmodernism “is con-
ditioned by certain intellectual, institutional and ideological contexts and strug-
gles” in European societies “that eventually led to the chasm between ‘academy
and civics’, especially the waning attention in ‘transformative theories of soci-
ety—what postmodernism calls grand narratives . . . .’ ” Adeshina Afolayan, We
Are All Postmodernists Now! African Philosophy and the Postmodern Agenda,
5(2) HEKMAT VA FALSAFEH (WISDOM AND PHILOSOPHY) 53, 61 (2009) (citing Paul T.
Zeleza, Historicizing the Posts: The View from African Studies, in POSTMODERN-
ISM, POSTCOLONIALITY AND AFRICAN STUDIES 2 (Zine Magubane ed., 2005)).
244. See id.
245. Nunn, supra note 15, at 328–38.
246. Id. at 330 n.24. Wade Nobles’s thought in this regard has been influential among
African-centered scholars. He advocates a broad definition of culture, suggesting
that culture be understood as “a construct representing the vast structural
processes of language, behavior, customs, knowledge, symbols, ideas and values
which provide people with a general design for living and patterns for interpret-
ing reality . . . .” Wade W. Nobles, Mass Communications and Mythic Conscious-
ness: The Role of Language and Culture in International Development, in
SEEKING THE SAKHU: FOUNDATIONAL WRITINGS FOR AN AFRICAN PSYCHOLOGY 221,
223 (2006). Nobles argues that culture should be conceptualized in three levels.
The “deep structure of culture” consists of a people’s ontology, cosmology, and
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centered perspective, “racism, sexism, etc., flow from the world-view
and conceptual system that is at the core of European culture.”247 The
world-view and conceptual system of European and European-derived
cultures is “grounded in materialism”248 and displays “an epistemol-
ogy, aesthetics and ethos based on material values.”249 As I have ar-
gued elsewhere, certain key components of European culture grow out
of the European materialist perspective.250 These include a dichoto-
mous reasoning style, hierarchical ordering, analytic thought, objecti-
fication, abstraction, extreme rationalism, and a rejection of spiritual
or sacred forces (desacralization).251 I have used the term “Eurocen-
tricity” to summarize these core cultural components.252
The point to be made here is that these Eurocentric values are
“baked into” postmodern philosophy and the anti-essentialist critique.
This is because “the materialistic paradigm of Eurocentric societies
produces certain cultural determinants, which shape and direct all so-
cial productions within the culture.”253 As I have described it, this in-
fluence is pervasive: “In this way, Eurocentricity reaches out to
delineate and direct everything the Eurocentric society produces,
within the realm of art, science, economics and social life. All social
and cultural productions—even the society’s concept of the law—will
reflect the materialism, aggression and individualism that Eurocen-
tricity generates.”254
Marimba Ani describes the intimate connection of individualism to
the driving engine of European culture, what she refers to as the
asili.255 The asili in European societies necessitates a drive for
power.256 This “necessitates the splitting of the self from other.”257
According to Ani:
What results is the concept of the individual (“not divisible”); the smallest unit
of the social group. This atom of the human universe is invented by the Euro-
pean as the seat of rational thought, the seat of moral action, [and] the locus of
power . . . . Clearly the concept of the “individual” is uniquely European, as is
axiology; a second intermediate level consists of “its emergent aspects, ethos, ide-
ology and worldview”; and a third surface level consists of “its manifestations,
customs, beliefs, behavior, language, etc.” Id. at 223–24.
247. Nunn, supra note 15, at 330–31.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 338.
251. Id. at 334–38.
252. Id. at 331.
253. Id. at 333.
254. Id. at 338.
255. In Ani’s conception, the asili is the ideological thrust or core of a culture. ANI,
supra note 224, at xxv.
256. Nunn, supra note 15, at 350.
257. Id.
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the resultant ideology of individualism and the economic system of capitalism
that accompanies it.258
As we see, Ani argues that the European societies have conse-
quently produced a particular brand of individualism that differs from
the world’s other cultures. She notes that this Eurocentric view of the
individual is “radically different from world majority ontological sys-
tems.”259 African people, in contrast, have no counterpart to the Euro-
pean view of the “individual” in their indigenous systems.260
According to Gyekye, while African societies recognize individual
needs, the overall emphasis is on communalistic values.261 The Afri-
can belief is that “social relationships are essential for every human
person, for no one is self-sufficient and therefore no one can, in isola-
tion, function adequately in the social context.”262 African communal-
ism is considered a natural state and a fundamental part of the
African concept of society.263 It is the well-being of the overall commu-
nity that sets the basis for individual happiness and thriving. In con-
trast to the individualistic values of Western societies described
above, such as freedom, independence, etc., African societies promote
communal values such as “sharing, mutual aid, caring for others, in-
terdependence, solidarity, reciprocal obligation, and social har-
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 351. That is not to say that Africans do not respect individuality. Africans
value individuality in much the same way as other majority cultures (that is to
say, nonwhites) do—in the context of the broader community in which the indi-
vidual lives. Ani argues this infuses the concept of individuality with greater
meaning:
Among the Hopi, Lee found that “[e]very individual, young and old, is
charged with responsibility for the welfare of the social unit.” This sup-
ports Diamond, who says that in traditional society the average individ-
ual participates to a greater extent than does the ordinary individual in
European society. The result of this is that the person has a significance
that she lacks in European culture. Her importance is qualitatively dif-
ferent. There is not just a verbal commitment to “valuing the individual.”
She means more to the group; her value is given content.
Id. at 350.
261. Kwame Gyekye, a professor of philosophy at the University of Ghana, describes
the delicate balance between communal and individualistic values in the African
context:
The fact the African people express appreciation for both communal and
individualistic values means that for them these two seemingly opposed
concepts can co-exist, however precariously. In all this, there is a clear
attempt and desire on the part of the African people to come to terms
with their assumptions about the natural sociality of the human person.
Their idea is that the individual cannot develop outside of the frame-
work of the community, but the welfare of the community as a whole
cannot dispense with the talents and initiatives of its individual mem-
bers either.
KWAME GYEKYE, AFRICAN CULTURAL VALUES: AN INTRODUCTION 50 (1996).
262. Id. at 36.
263. Id.
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mony.”264 These values are inherent in the proverbs found in many
parts of Africa. One such proverb reads, “If you don’t let your friend
get nine, you won’t get ten.”265 This proverb suggests that one cannot
obtain one’s goals independently. One must work collectively to be
successful.266 Another Akan proverb holds, “Solitariness . . . is a pitia-
ble condition.”267 These proverbs express an African concept of moral-
ity and virtue. What is morally good in Africa is that which “promotes
social welfare, solidarity and harmony in human relationships.”268
Traditionally, African cultures have been able to reinforce indige-
nous communalistic values in their societies and resist the lure of indi-
vidualism. But individualism is an outgrowth of a particular way of
life and not a racial trait. As African societies have modernized, they
have shifted toward the individualistic behavior so prevalent in the
West.269 But communalism is not only truer to African roots, it is a
way of moral behavior that better serves the interests of African peo-
ple. As Gyekye puts it:
[A]ppropriate attention will have to be given to [whether] communal val-
ues . . . are worth maintaining. Ultimately, it is a matter of moral evaluation
and choice. In my opinion, the African people and their cultures should resist
the path of extreme individualism, which will lead to the rise of lonely crowds
in their societies and the fragmentation of values and, in consequence, under-
mine the whole meaning and essence of a human society.270
To the extent that essentialism is a perspective that encourages
one to seek out commonalities and connections between individuals
and within groups, essentialism is a framework that embraces the val-
ues of African people. There is thus no moral reason to reject essen-
tialism per se. Whether an essentialist position can be described as
morally correct or not must be determined on some factor other than
the tendency of essentialist thought to privilege groups over individu-
als. Certainly, the context in which essentialism is deployed makes all
the difference and this recognition makes the issue of whether essen-
tialist concepts or behavior is appropriate or not a political question,
not a moral one.271
264. Id. at 35. The relationship between individual and community is not one-way.
Among the baKongo, the community undertakes a responsibility for each and
every child. See SIMON BOCKIE, DEATH AND THE INVISIBLE POWERS: THE WORLD OF
KONGO BELIEF 31 (1993) (“In contrast to Western attitudes, the individual in
Manianga philosophy is viewed as both a community creation and a community
responsibility.”).
265. The 50 Most Important Akan Proverbs, ADINKRA SYMBOLS, http://www.adinkra
symbols.org/the-50-most-important-akan-proverbs/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
U6RE-SLYP].
266. Id.
267. GYEKYE, supra note 261, at 38.
268. Id. at 57.
269. Id. at 51.
270. Id.
271. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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B. Ontological Position and the Question of “Truth”
African people do not only embrace different ethics and values
than European people, their characteristic axiology derives from a dis-
tinctive view of the nature of reality and thus the nature of truth.272
Africans believe in a reality that is fundamentally spiritual in nature
and that the material world we see and operate in, while not an illu-
sion, is merely the surface manifestation of a deeper spiritual
realm.273 Thinkers in the ancient Kongo kingdom described this foun-
dational spiritual world as ku mpe`mba.274 Ku mpe`mba was the abode
of spirits and ancestors and the place of creation.275 All things began
in ku mpe`mba and then entered the material world, ku nseke, for a
cycle of birth, growth, fulfillment, and death before returning to the
primordial Ku mpe`mba.276 The Yoruba277 and the Igbo278 peoples of
southern Nigeria perceived the universe in similar terms.
This African ontology means that the true character of a thing is
not described by its material manifestation but by its intangible, spiri-
tual essence.279 In the African construct, all material things have an
272. Elsewhere I have described how different cultures produce different value sys-
tems through their differing views of reality. The material focus of European soci-
eties produces their unique axiology (values). “The materialistic paradigm of
Eurocentric societies produces certain cultural determinates, which shape and
direct all social productions within the culture. These cultural determinates man-
ifest themselves mainly in the areas of thought structuring and processing and
include epistemological values and logic.” Nunn, supra note 15, at 333. Ani dis-
cusses how culture, through shared experiences of reality, produces the culture’s
axiology. She states that “[t]o its members, culture re-presents values (which they
themselves have created together out of shared experiences) as a systemic set of
ideas and a single coherent statement.” ANI, supra note 224, at 5.
273. See BOCKIE, supra note 264, at 1 (demonstrating how the African “community
itself is viewed as the embodiment of spiritual reality, a reality present every-
where, at all times”).
274. KIMBWANDE`NDE KIA BUNSEKI FU-KIAU, SELF-HEALING POWER AND THERAPY: OLD
TEACHINGS FROM AFRICA 8 (1980).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 8–9; see BARBARO MARTINEZ-RUIZ, KONGO GRAPHIC WRITING AND OTHER
NARRATIVES OF THE SIGN 68–72 (2013) (describing the cyclical journey around the
Kongo cosmogram and its mythical meaning).
277. See Babatunde Lawal, Aye´l’oja`; O`runn’ile´: Imagining and Performing Yoruba
Cosmology, in AFRICAN COSMOS: STELLAR ARTS 217–28 (2012) (describing “Igba
I`wa`, ‘the Calabash of Existence’”).
278. See SIMEON ONYEWUEKE EBOH, AN AFRICAN CONCEPT OF LAW AND ORDER: A CASE
STUDY OF IGBO TRADITIONAL SOCIETY 29–53 (2003) (describing a cyclic process of
becoming between visible and invisible worlds).
279. See KWAME GYEKYE, AFRICAN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT: THE AKAN CONCEPTUAL
SCHEME 69 (Temple Univ. Press rev. ed. 1995) (1987) (“What is primarily real is
spiritual.”). There are similar perspectives in Western thought, chiefly of a relig-
ious character. See, e.g., Charlene P.E. Burns, Cognitive Science & Christian The-
ology, in SOUL, PSYCHE, BRAIN: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF BRAIN-MIND
SCIENCE 181–85 (reviewing Christian debates on the nature of the soul and
“claim that the essence of the person . . . resides or rests with Christ”); EN-
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essence.280 Thus, “essentialism” of a type is indispensable in the Afri-
can worldview.281 To Africans, humans, plants, animals, material
items, and the various elements of the natural world (fire, water,
earth, wind, sun, moon, etc.) are manifestations of spirit.282 Each of
them is a symbolic representation of reality that carries esoteric
meaning and allows access to truth.283
One such item of particular significance in Kongo thought is the
nkisi (plural minkisi).284 Minkisi are power objects that may be used
for healing, protection, or to bless or curse.285 Although they are found
in physical form, they are understood by the Bakongo to be spirits.286
One particular form of nkisi, relevant to discussions of law, is the
nkondi (plural minkondi).287 A nkondi is a human shaped figure,
carved from wood, that is usually depicted holding a spear aloft as if to
COUNTERS OF BODY AND SOUL IN CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS PRACTICES x–xxvii
(Anna Fedele & Ruy Llera Blanes eds., 2011) (describing challenges to “the clas-
sic binarism between ‘body’ and ‘soul’”). However, these are disfavored in modern
philosophy and wholly rejected by postmodernists. But whatever position
postmodernists have on this, it must be understood that it is based on debates
and developments that are specific to Europeans and cannot necessarily be uni-
versalized to the rest of the world. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying
text.
280. For example, Gyekye writes, “The Akan universe, essentially spiritual, is en-
dowed or charged with varying degrees of force or power. This force or power is
sunsum, usually translated as ‘spirit . . . .” GYEKYE, supra note 279, at 72.
281. Id.; see also JOHN MBITI, AFRICAN RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHY 257 (1970) (“Afri-
can people know that the universe has a power, force or whatever else one may
call it, in addition to [physical objects].”).
282. Again, according to Gyekye, the word sunsum “is used to refer to the mystical
powers believed to exist in the world. These powers are believed to constitute the
inner essences or intrinsic properties of natural objects, and are believed to be
contained in those objects.” GYEKE, supra note 279, at 73.
283. See JANHEINZ JAHN, MUNTU: AFRICAN CULTURE AND THE WESTERN WORLD 156–84
(Marjorie Grene trans., 1990) (describing the character of “things” (kintu) and
denoting how such things take on a symbolic function through what Jahn calls a
process of “designation”).
284. CHRISTOPHER C. FENNELL, CROSSROADS AND COSMOLOGIES: DIASPORAS AND
ETHNOGENESIS IN THE NEW WORLD 56 (Paul A. Shackel ed., 2007).
285. MARTINEZ-RUIZ, supra note 276, at 150.
286. Id. at 149; see also MACGAFFEY, supra note 2, at 78–79 (describing the spiritual
character of minkisi and relating that “[t]he Kongo term nkisi relates etymologi-
cally to other Central African words often translated as ‘spirit.’ ”). Conceding that
the concept of the nkisi is complex, MacGaffey nevertheless states:
Ultimately, the nkisi is an invisible personality, with a certain specific
identity, which has chosen, or been induced, to invest itself in these ob-
jects and persons, through whom the powers attributed to it become ef-
fective. “The nkisi-object is a mechanism and a manner of domesticating,
imprisoning, capturing simbi spirits in a material object which both rep-
resents and re-doubles them.”
Id. at 80 (citations omitted).
287. ALISA LAGAMMA, Kongo: Power and Majesty, in KONGO: POWER AND MAJESTY 37
(2015).
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strike an enemy.288 A cavity is carved inside the nkondi where items
such as herbs, bones, etc. are deposited in order to empower the
nkondi.289 Frequently, this cavity is covered with a mirror, shells,
bones, or metal.290 A nkondi is an enforcer of contracts.291 A nkondi is
covered with nails or metal spikes. Each nail represents an agreement
of some sort.292 The nail is hammered in by the parties to demonstrate
their undertaking of the agreement represented by the nail.293 Should
the parties fail to uphold the promise secured by the nkondi, then it is
believed that the nkondi’s spirit will track them down and harm
them.294 Although a nkondi looks like a wooden statue covered in
nails, in the Kongo worldview it is in fact a powerful spirit that is
worthy of fear and respect.295 This powerful nkondi spirit is its
essence.
Similarly, in African cultures, the human personality itself is be-
lieved to have an essence.296 In Kongo belief, the human body is sim-
ply a shell. In addition to the physical body (or nitu), a person consists
of a kini and a mwela.297 The kini “is the member that dictates a
man’s behavior.”298 If anything is the “essence,” as that term is under-
288. FENNELL, supra note 284, at 61.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See id. at 60 (asserting the nkondi “was often used for public ceremonies of oath
taking and for consecrating political and social arrangements”); MARTINEZ-RUIZ,
supra note 276, at 166 (describing a nkondi as a type of “sculpture in which pieces
of iron are often hammered in for the swearing of oaths and concluding of
alliances”).
292. Id.
293. LAGAMMA, supra note 287.
294. Id. at 37–38. Indeed, the term nkondi means “hunter.” Id. at 37. LaGamma de-
scribes how nkondi were used to deter antisocial behavior, to attack foes, or to
ensure peace. Id. at 39.
295. See FENNELL, supra note 284, at 61 (reporting nkondi “were often viewed as
hunter minkisis, which continued manifestations of a powerful simbi spirit that
could track down, bind, and vanquish malevolent spirits and other forces . . . .”).
MacGaffey describes how these nkondi nkisi spirits could be violent and danger-
ous, not only to other spirits but to men, indeed entire villages. See MACGAFFEY,
supra note 2, at 101–04 (detailing dangers thought to come from nkondi).
296. See, e.g., GYEKYE, supra note 279, at 85 (describing the oˆkra in Akan philosophy
as “that which constitutes the innermost self, the essence, of the individual per-
son”). Tempels makes this point in attempting to clarify the definition of the
Bantu word “muntu,” which is often translated as “human.”
In Tempels’s view: It seems to me incorrect to translate this word
“muntu” by “the man”. The “muntu” certainly possesses a visible body,
but this body is not the “muntu”. A Bantu one day explained to one of my
colleagues that the “muntu” is rather what you call in English the “per-
son” and not what you connote by “the man”. “Muntu” signifies, then,
vital force, endowed with intelligence and will.
PLACIDE TEMPELS, BANTU PHILOSOPHY 55 (1959).
297. BOCKIE, supra note 264, at 129.
298. Id.
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stood in Western philosophy, the kini would be it. The kini “exerts
control over this world’s visible [body, the] nitu, [the] nitu has no in-
fluence over it.”299 The mwela equates to the soul in Western religious
thought.300 It “gives life” to both the nitu and the kini.301 According to
Bockie:
At death, when the visible nitu dies, kini and mwela exit from it to start their
journey to the other world. Together they form the life-body, that which con-
tinues alive, as opposed to the death-body [the nitu], which has been discarded
and left behind.302
The Kemetic, or Ancient Egyptian view is similar. The Ancient Egyp-
tians also believed a person had a body, an essence, and a soul.303 The
corporal body was called the khat;304 the animating spirit or essence,
the ka;305 and the soul, the ba.306
One could argue that these African ontological beliefs in the exis-
tence of essence are simply wrong; that they represent, at best, “primi-
tive” misunderstandings of the nature of reality.307 But such a
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 130.
302. Id. at 129.
303. See ADOLPH ERMAN, LIFE IN ANCIENT EGYPT 307 (H.M. Tirard trans., Dover ed.,
1971) (1894) (asserting Egyptians conceptualized the human personality as con-
sisting of “the body, the soul and . . . [the] ka”).
304. JOHN ANTHONY WEST, THE TRAVELER’S KEY TO ANCIENT EGYPT 64–65 (1985).
305. Id. at 64. According to West, the ka is the “spiritual essence of the deceased.” Id.
at 14; see also MARGARET BUNSON, A DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT EGYPT 130 (1991)
(describing ka as “the ancient Egyptian term for a spiritual essence, which ex-
isted alongside human form and yet maintained individuality”); R.T. RUNDLE
CLARK, MYTH AND SYMBOL IN ANCIENT EGYPT 51 (1959) (describing that for the
Egyptians “God [is] the spirit who assigns to everything its essence—its Ka”).
306. WEST, supra note 304, at 63. The Ancient Egyptians had a very complex view of
the person, which was made up of many components in addition to the physical
body, any of which, in one way or another, could be viewed as making up the
essence of a person beyond the physical body. These include the khaibit (ghost,
shadow, or “shade”), the akh (“light body”), the sekhem (“power”), and the ren
(name). Id. at 65.
307. The belief that white, Western, and European cultures epitomize the height of
human achievement is widely held. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the
Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J.
1419, 1444 (2016) (quoting Gary Peller for describing the dominant narrative of
the West as one of inevitable progress “from myth to enlightenment, ignorance to
knowledge, superstition to reason, primitive culture to civilization, religion to
secularism, and . . . status to individual liberty”). As Goldberg states about the
concept of “the primitive”:
Like Race . . . the concept of The Primitive proved theoretically adapta-
ble, appropriating novel theoretical developments as its own by being
appropriable as a concept central and so seemingly necessary to theoreti-
cal advance . . . . The Primitive assumed synonymy with the racial
Other, a technical nomenclature for a popular category . . . . Formerly,
primitive societies were theorized in binary differentiation from a civi-
lized order: nomadic rather than settled; sexually promiscuous, polyga-
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conclusion would be ethnocentric and racist.308 More importantly,
however, such a conclusion would be beside the point. Whether one is
convinced of the ontological truth of African concepts of essence, it is
clear that they are pervasively held within African societies and by
individuals who are grounded in African culture. Thus, the belief in
the non-existence of essences is neither universal nor inevitable.
Rather, like most beliefs, it is dependent on the cultural context that
the individual is situated in. To the extent that the moral claim that
essentialism is wrong is based on an ontological claim about essences
(i.e., essences do not exist), such a moral claim is dependent upon be-
ing in a Eurocentric cultural space.309
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to demonstrate that CRT’s anti-
essentialism critique is impractical and misguided ideologically. It is
impractical because adopting CRT’s stance on anti-essentialism would
make it impossible to organize the African community or to advance
African interests. Strong versions of the critique would prevent recog-
nizing any identity that was formed around race and/or ethnic iden-
tity. Weak versions of the critique would allow a contingent Black
identity, but it is clear that even this weaker version would take an
integrationist tenor and not allow any type of Black nationalist or-
ganizing. Any African-only organizing would be viewed as morally
suspect.
mous, and communal in family and property relations rather than
monogamous, nuclear, and committed to private property; illogical in
mentality and practicing magic rather than rational and scientific. In
popular terms, nonwhite primitives have come to be perceived as child-
like, intuitive, and spontaneous; they require the iron fist of ‘European’
governance and paternalistic guidance to control inherent physical [vio-
lent tendencies] and sexual drives . . . . [T]he civilized have a history, but
the Primitive have none: their histories are frozen.
DAVID T. GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING
156–57 (1993), cited in Keith Aoki, “Foreign-Ness” & Asian American Identities:
Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Sterotypes, 4 ASIAN
PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 60 (1996). It is this sense of the “Primitive/Civilized” binary that
the opening quote from Jason Young is intended to capture. See YOUNG, supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
308. See Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Mul-
ticulturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1602 (1996) (“The idea that certain cul-
tures are more ‘advanced’ has been discredited as racist for decades by scholars
. . . .”).
309. It is unfortunate that CRT debates on essentialism do not, on the whole, consider
African philosophy, African intellectual heritage, or the African worldview, gen-
erally. See the discussion of anti-essentialism in CRT, supra Part II. I would hope
that scholars of color, in particular, would not engage in this form of Eurocentr-
ism and would at least be aware of their own cultural heritage, even if they did
not ultimately agree with it.
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Anti-essentialism is also ideologically misguided. The anti-essen-
tialism critique prevalent in CRT derives from the adoption of
postmodern theories about the nature of reality and the self. Yet,
postmodern indeterminacy, reductionism, and opposition to struc-
turalism make it difficult for CRT to uphold its professed commit-
ments to the needs of the local and the particular. Moreover, it is
contradictory for CRT to struggle against social constructs like racism
and sexism when, according to postmodern theory, persistent social
constructs like these would not even exist.
More importantly, the assumptions of post-modernism are based
on an analysis that privileges and universalizes European intellectual
history and European values. To the extent that ethics are based on
values, the Eurocentric foundation of the CRT anti-essentialism cri-
tique makes its ethical position problematic for African people and for
other people of color. Non-Europeans do not privilege individualism to
the extent that Europeans do and consequently do not see the promo-
tion of group interests as a problem to be overcome. In focusing on the
individual over the collective, anti-essentialism promotes a false
universal.
Finally, anti-essentialism adopts a view of reality that is alien to
the African mind. Although the postmodern claim that there are no
essences may seem commonsensical to individuals trained in a Euro-
pean system, to individuals who live in a universe filled with spirit,
such a view would seem reductionist and strange. A moral prescrip-
tion cannot work if it commands belief or behavior that is viewed as
impossible or illogical.310
An appropriate ethics for African people would promote what is
viewed as good in an African-centered cultural context and would fit
the African worldview. African people value communalism and collec-
tivity over individualism, and African people believe in the existence
of essence. Plainly, anti-essentialism does not fit the bill.
For African activists and scholars, the charge that one is an essen-
tialist is meaningless. One does not need to stop organizational activi-
ties to respond to such a charge, nor should one be concerned with
shaping one’s affiliations or one’s thinking so that the charge will not
be leveled. Although anti-essentialism asserts itself as a moral prerog-
ative, I conclude that there is no ethical obligation for African-cen-
310. Thus, a fundamental principle of criminal responsibility is that the accused must
have the capacity to follow the commands of the law. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISH-
MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 181 (1968) (“[A] primary vindication of the principle of
responsibility could rest on the simple idea that unless a man has the capacity
and a fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behavior [sic] to the law its penal-
ties ought not to be applied to him.”); see also SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN
REASON 117 (1990) (arguing that a person who is incapable of endorsing and act-
ing in conformity with moral values does not deserve blame).
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tered activists to avoid essentialism. Rather than honor an ethics that
does not honor us, that challenges our very right to exist, Africans
“must claim our heritage as our base for solving problems, collectively,
[and] not as individuals.”311
The task that lies before us was described beautifully by the
Ghanaian author Ayi Kwei Armah in the conclusion to his novel Two
Thousand Seasons:
There is no beauty but in relationships. Nothing cut off by itself is beautiful.
Never can things in destructive relationships be beautiful. All beauty is in the
creative purpose of our relationships; all ugliness is in the destructive aims of
the destroyer’s arrangements. The mind that knows this, the destroyers will
set traps for it, but the destroyers’ traps will never hold that mind. The group
that knows this and that works knowing this, such a group itself is a work of
beauty, creation’s work. Against such a group the destroyers will set traps for
the body, traps for the heart, traps to destroy the mind. Such a group none of
the destroyers’ traps can hold.312
311. Hilliard, supra note 214, at 19.
312. AYI KWEI ARMAH, TWO THOUSAND SEASONS 316–17 (Per Ankh ed., 2000).
